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Abstract 
This paper studies the Bankruptcy Law in Latin America, focusing on the Brazilian reform. We start 
with a review of the international literature and its evolution on this subject. Next, we examine the 
economic incentives associated with several aspects of bankruptcy laws and insolvency procedures in 
general, as well as the trade-offs involved. After this theoretical discussion, we evaluate empirically 
the current stage of the quality of insolvency procedures in Latin America using data from Doing 
Business and World Development Indicators, both from World Bank and International Financial 
Statistics from IMF. We find that the region is governed by an inefficient law, even when compared 
with regions of lower per capita income. As theoretical and econometric models predict, this 
inefficiency has severe consequences for credit markets and the cost of capital. Next, we focus on the 
recent Brazilian bankruptcy reform, analyzing its main changes and possible effects over the 
economic environment. The appendix describes difficulties of this process of reform in Brazil, and 
what other Latin American countries can possibly learn from it.         
JEL classification: G33; K40; K00 
Keywords: Bankruptcy; Financial Distress; Legal System; Law and Economics 
I – Introduction 
The modern economic theory recognizes more and more the relevancy of the legal and institutional 
structures for the good functioning and development of the economy. The present paper works specifically 
on the law that governs the bankruptcy procedure of corporations, its characteristics and effects over the 
economic environment, besides the recent reforms that occurred in Latin America focusing specially on the 
Brazilian case.     
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Firms take debts for several different reasons. One important characteristic of this act is that such 
firms wish to repay their debts with their future gains. But, there is always the possibility, for some reason, of 
no fulfillment of such repayment promise. The bankruptcy law is concerned with what happens in such 
circumstances.  
In the absence of a bankruptcy law, a creditor has two legal procedures at his disposal. First, in the 
case of secured loan, creditors can seize the firm’s assets that serve as collateral for their loans. Second, in 
case of unsecured loans, creditors can go to court asking to sell some of the firm’s assets. However, this 
method of debt collection runs into difficulties when there are many creditors and the debtor’s assets do not 
cover his liabilities (i.e. when the firm is insolvent). Under these conditions each creditor will try to be the 
first to recover his debts. This uncoordinated race of creditors may lead to the dismantlement of the firm’s 
assets, and to a loss of value for all creditors. 
Given this situation, it is in the collective interest that the disposition of the debtor’s assets be carried 
out in an orderly way, via a centralized bankruptcy procedure. 
In a perfect world, there would be no need of a bankruptcy law because individuals could solve this 
problem via contracts, i.e. the debtor could specify as part of the debt’s contract what would happen in case 
of default (like the division and the procedure). Writing such contracts is in fact very difficult, since debtors 
may acquire new creditors and assets as time passes and it may be very hard to specify how the division 
process should change as function of such adjustments. Besides, in practice, contracts like this are not 
written. Therefore, the bankruptcy law provides a default option for this problem of contract incompleteness.   
To summarize the role of the bankruptcy law, we can say that it works to avoid problems of 
uncoordinated debt collection and contract incompleteness in a situation of no repayment of debts. But how 
should the bankruptcy law look like? Most countries have two bankruptcy procedures, one for liquidating 
assets of failing firms and another for reorganizing failing firms. 
When a firm files for bankruptcy liquidation, the bankruptcy court appoints a trustee who shuts the 
firm down and sells its assets. This could be done in different ways: sale of the business or its productive 3
 
units or piecemeal sale of its assets, depending on the demand and which option maximizes the value of the 
company's assets. The Absolute-Priority Rule determines how the proceeds of sale are divided among the 
claimants. It specifies what claims are paid in full according to an order defined by the bankruptcy law of 
each country. 
However, when capital markets are imperfect, what is very common in developing countries, the 
best managers may not be able to raise the cash necessary to buy the firm. The firm may be inefficiently 
dismantled and its assets sold cheaply. Therefore, reorganization provides a good alternative for countries 
that have problems in their capital markets. An additional explanation
1 for the loss of value in liquidation is 
that when a firm in financial distress needs to sell assets, its industry peers are likely to be experiencing 
problem themselves, leading the asset sales to prices below value in best use. Hence, in cases where asset 
specificity and the correlation of returns across the firm are high, reorganization is likely to maximize the 
insolvency return instead of liquidation. 
An alternative solution for the liquidation procedure, especially for firms financially distressed
2 but 
not economically inefficient
3 is the reorganization procedure, where there is no actual sale of the company's 
assets. There are different approaches to choose between both proceedings. Some countries (like Germany, 
France and England) prefer to give the exclusive control of the proceeding to an outside official who makes 
the initial decision whether the firm will be liquidated or remain in operation while a reorganization plan is 
formulated. Other countries choose to supervise the manager with an impartial and independent administrator 
who assumes complete power if management proves incompetent or negligent or has engaged in fraud or 
misbehavior. And finally, there are countries (like the U.S.) that give managers the right to choose between 
filing for bankruptcy liquidation or reorganization together with exclusive power to propose a reorganization 
plan. 
                                                           
1See Shleifer and Vishny (1992) 
2 A firm is in financial distress or insolvent when it can no longer meet its debt obligations with another firm or institution. 
3A firm is economically efficient if the best use of its capital is the current use and it is economically inefficient if the value of its 
assets is greater in some other use.    4
 
Once the reorganized procedure is chosen over liquidation, there is a conflict between the secured 
creditors' right to claim their collateral versus the goal of reorganizing the firm. In order to reorganize 
successfully, it must retain assets, which are crucial to its operations, but secured creditors often wish to 
claim these assets.  In some countries this conflict is resolved in the firm's favor by applying an automatic 
stay to secured creditors (like U.S.), making the reorganization process more appealing. This protection 
varies from one country to another, with some not applying it, like the United Kingdom and Germany, 
thereby weakening or even eliminating the possibility of reorganization. 
The next step is to provide the reorganization plan that specifies how much each creditor will 
receive in cash or claims from the new firm. An appropriate majority of creditors should be required to 
approve a plan. Assuming that reorganizing the firm causes it to be worth more than its assets would bring in 
liquidation, usually the reorganization procedure provides a framework within which creditors and managers 
(with equity holders) bargain over the distribution of the extra value and eventually adopt a reorganization 
plan, otherwise, if there is no agreement, the firm is liquidated. 
  The law leaves the division of the reorganized company's value to a process of bargaining among the 
classes of participants. Each class of equity holders and debt holders whose interests are not aligned must 
vote to approve a reorganization plan, which should include a division of value. The outcome of this 
bargaining process often diverges from the legal rights of the classes since managers and shareholders have 
some bargain power. It should be noted that violations of absolute priority rule usually happen in the 
reorganization procedure. 
Ideally, the bankruptcy law should provide a good balance between liquidation and reorganization 
procedures, in such a way that minimizes the so-called Filtering Failure problem. There are two different 
cases of filtering failure problem: the first is when economically efficient firms in financial distress are 
liquidated but should be reorganized (its value would be bigger in reorganization), which is called Type I 
Error; the second is when economically inefficient and financially distressed firms are saved in 
reorganization but should be liquidated, which is called Type II Error. Avoiding filtering failure problem 5
 
makes the efficiency of the economy higher since the good firms will stay alive and the bad ones will be 
closed, passing its assets to firms with higher efficiency.   
A good design of bankruptcy law’s procedures may influence in different ways the establishment of a 
healthy business environment. From an ex-post efficiency perspective, a bankruptcy law should maximize 
the total value of the company and consequently, the pay-off that creditors receive from insolvent firms. The 
positive effect comes over the cost of capital that is reduced since the expectation of recovery by creditors is 
higher in case of bankruptcy. As important as the ex-post efficiency is the ex-ante efficiency. At this 
perspective what matters is not the total value of the failed firm, but the division of its value among the 
participants. An ex-ante efficient bankruptcy law is capable to produce rights incentives over managers’ 
decisions, in both the initial period of firm’s life and after the firm goes to financial distress. Bankruptcy 
procedures should penalize managers adequately in bankruptcy states. Without any adverse consequence at 
all there is very little incentive to work hard in the early stage of a firm’s life to pay its debts. This incentive 
has implications in the portion of insolvent firms and it is reduced when well provided. In the post-
insolvency period, the management will tend to give rise to two inefficient bankruptcy decisions: first, 
undertaking excessively risky investments as a means of avoiding bankruptcy; second, delaying filing for 
bankruptcy aiming at extracting pecuniary gains as much as possible. A good insolvency system reserves 
some portion of value in bankruptcy for managers and shareholders to motivate actions in favor of efficient 
investment and timely decisions.  
Notice that all mechanisms cited above contribute to a larger expected return of creditors, or by 
raising the return in bankruptcy states or by diminishing the probability of bankruptcy, reducing the cost of 
capital in the economy. Since an ex-ante objective of the bankruptcy law should be to maximize the project 
option set that creditors want to finance, lower capital costs are fundamental to reach this goal. 
La Porta et al (1998) study empirically the impact of different bankruptcy laws in financial markets. 
The authors found that countries with a bankruptcy system that gives a higher protection to creditors have 
better and broader functioning financial markets than countries where the legal system provides weaker 6
 
support to creditors. They argue that better legal protections provide a high expected return in bankruptcy 
states, enabling the financiers to offer entrepreneurs money at better terms. Levine et al (2000), studying 
empirically the second-order consequence of changes in bankruptcy law, found a strong link between 
financial development (that could be boosted by changes in bankruptcy law) and growth. Their econometric 
results suggest that, for example, if Brazilian financial market increases in 10%, Brazil could grow 0.6% 
faster per year. The reason for this effect on growth comes from the reduction in the cost of capital, 
promoting entrepreneurship by the creation of new firms and investments and therefore, fostering the 
economic growth.       
The severe economic crises experienced by Latin American countries in the early 80’s served as a 
natural experiment to alert that most of them needed to reform their bankruptcy system. Bergoeing et al 
(2002) compare the recoveries of the Mexican and Chilean economic crises in the early 80’s. Chile carried 
out an administrative reform of the bankruptcy management service in 1978; the 1982 bankruptcy reform law 
clearly defined the rights of each creditor and replaced public officials for private officials. The old law does 
not provide for an efficient and timely bankruptcy management because it relied on poorly paid public 
officials and highly bureaucratic procedures. In contrast Mexico had an obsolete and unwieldy bankruptcy 
law from 1943 effective until 2000. The authors concluded that despite many similarities in initial conditions, 
such as appreciation of real exchange rates, large current-account deficits, inflation, and weakness in the 
banking sector, the reform of bankruptcy procedures in Chile had effects on both incentives to accumulate 
capital and efficiency with which that capital was accumulated
4. Both effects are crucial to explain that 
Chilean faster recovery was due to its earlier bankruptcy law reforms.  
An extra relevant function of the bankruptcy law design is to avoid, as much as possible, fraud. 
Fraudulent actions have an important role in bankruptcy process mainly in Latin America. Mechanisms that 
contribute to raise the role of creditors (like an active participation in reorganization) and the expected return 
in bankruptcy, work to increase their incentive in monitoring the bankruptcy procedure, making fraudulent 7
 
actions more difficult. Taking the former Brazilian Bankruptcy Law as an example, due to the top priority of 
labor and tax claims, creditors receive almost nothing in bankruptcy states, eliminating their incentive in 
participating in the bankruptcy procedure. Another important source of fraud in Brazil was also provided by 
the top priority of labor credit. This structure of priority opened the possibility of managers to cheat the law 
by creating jobs to “friends” in such a way to receive as regular workers (for the manager) of the failing firm. 
Therefore, the structure of priorities acts to avoid fraud, besides reducing the cost of capital. 
Nowadays, despite all research in bankruptcy there is no conclusion about the design of the optimal 
bankruptcy law. However, there exist two consensual points in this debate. The first concerns the protection 
that bankruptcy law must provide for creditors and the second is about the goals-of-insolvency procedure.  















































































Recovery Rate vs. Creditors' Protection
 
Note: Creditors’ protection index is calculated by the interaction between the measure of creditors’ rights of La Porta et al (1997) 
and the variable of legal enforcement “rule of law”.  
 
Source: Doing Business database, International Country Risk Guide, World Development Indicators and International Financial 
Statistics 
 
Evidences in the empirical field show that countries with strong legal creditors’ protection would 
provide for firms an easier access to external finance in the form of both high value and broader capital 
markets. This happens because creditors expect to recover a bigger portion of their loans in case of 
insolvency. In this case they will be more prone to supply credit, making it cheaper and easy to get. Figure 1 
illustrates exactly this situation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
4 However, since Chile also made changes in the banking law and the paper did not disentangle the dynamics effects of both 8
 
The other consensual point concerns goals-of-insolvency stated by Oliver Hart (1999). The author 
specifies characteristics of a good bankruptcy procedure, which are three-fold: first, it should deliver an ex-
post efficient outcome, which maximizes the firm’s total value available to be divided among the interested 
parties; second, it should penalize debtors adequately in bankruptcy states, otherwise it could exacerbate the 
moral-hazard problem; and finally, but not least important, it should preserve the order of the claims defined 
when the contract was created, which helps to ensure that creditors receive a reasonable return in bankruptcy 
state and therefore encourages lending. Figure 2 illustrates the positive effects of goals-of-insolvency stated 
by Hart over the credit market.  
Using both measures, we can feel that Brazil and Latin America have a quite inefficient bankruptcy 
procedure and that the bankruptcy law provides a low level of creditor protection, both results with negative 
effect on their credit market, cost of capital and creditors’ recovery rate. Notice by Table 1 how poorly the 
Brazilian bankruptcy law was doing in both crucial variables, much worse than the average of Latin 
American Countries. 
















































































Recovery Rate vs. Goals-of-Insolvency
 
Note: Goals-of-insolvency index is calculated as the simple average of the cost of insolvency, time of insolvency, the observance 
of absolute priority of claims and the efficient outcome achieved. It ranges from 0 to 100: a score of 100 on the index means 
perfect efficiency, while 0 means that the insolvency system does not function at all. 
 






                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
reforms, it is possible that part of the differences between Chile and Mexico comes from the banking reform.     9
 
Table 1: Bankruptcy Law Indicators 
  Creditors’ Protection [0,1]  Goals-of-Insolvency [0,100] 
Brazil 0.06  24.0 
Mean of Latin American Countries  0.19  46.3 
Mean of OECD   0.46  79.6 
         Source: Doing Business 2003 
 
Despite both consensual issues, the design of this law is still a real challenge, which makes the reform 
process very difficult. In the economic literature there is no convergence of opinions about how an optimal 
bankruptcy law should be, especially concerning violations of the absolute priority rule (i.e. the violation in 
the receiving order in case of bankruptcy). This occurs due to trade-offs that exist in case of violation or not 
of the absolute priority rule (from here on APR).  
The role of the APR is to determine how the division of the failing firms’ value is done. It specifies 
that claims are paid in full in the following order: first, administrative expenses of the bankruptcy process; 
second, claims taking statutory priority, such as tax claims, rent claims, and unpaid wages and benefits; and 
third, unsecured creditors’ claims, including those of trade creditors. Equity holders receive the remainder, if 
any. Usually
5 secured creditors are outside the priority ordering because they have bargained with the firm 
for the right to claim a particular asset or its value if the firm files for bankruptcy. Thus, they may receive a 
payoff in bankruptcy even when all other creditors receive nothing. This rule is easily followed in liquidation 
procedure because the cash received is simply distributed among claimants according to the priority of their 
claims defined by the bankruptcy law. However, in reorganization procedure the sale of the company’s assets 
is fictional. Consequently, no verifiable objective figure is available for the total value to be distributed (like 
the cash in liquidation). In this situation, a conflict of interest among participants emerges. Senior creditors 
have an incentive to advance a low valuation of the firm’s value, because a low valuation would entitle them 
to a larger fraction of the reorganized company. For a similar reason, managers and equity holders have an 
incentive to advance a high valuation. Reorganization procedures – like Chapter 11 of U. S. Bankruptcy 
Code – that chose firms’ restructuring plan using a bargaining process between interested parties allow 
deviations from the order specified by the bankruptcy law. The violation of APR means that equity holders, 10
 
who always have bottom priority, get some amount of the firm’s value even when secured creditors’ claims 
are not paid in full.  
Bankruptcy laws that do not offer a reorganization procedure like Chapter 11 to insolvent firms, rule 
out the possibility of APR deviations. This is valuable because the priority of creditors is maintained, 
guaranteeing bigger returns once the firm filed for bankruptcy. Moreover, the nonviolation of APR offers the 
correct incentive to managers’ effort, minimizing problems of moral-hazard and therefore raises the 
possibility of firms’ success. On the other hand, bankruptcy laws that provide the possibility of 
reorganization like Chapter 11, APR violations are possible. Despite its negative effect in the level of effort 
chosen by managers, such violation inhibits investments in inefficient risky projects when the firm is in 
financial distress; encourages desirable investments in firm’s specific capital; and makes easier the 
transference of information to creditors, improving the timing of filing to bankruptcy. Such benefits tend to 
increase the firms’ return in both bankruptcy states and non-bankruptcy states. Sometimes this higher return 
in bankruptcy states may offset creditors’ direct losses of such violation (i.e. the part of the value that is given 
to managers and shareholders in bankruptcy), reducing the cost of capital.             
Proposals of rigid legal structures that admit just the liquidation as a solution to insolvent firms were 
defended since the mid 80’s until the beginning of the 90’s by auctions’ method, as a way to avoid deviations 
from APR. Under the auctions approach, the assets of the insolvent company will be always put on the block 
and auctioned off. Nevertheless, this method does not provide the possibility of reorganization for 
economically efficient firms (leading to a high frequency of type I error and to an inefficient allocation of 
assets); and it might result in systematic under-pricing
6. With the evolution in the literature of bankruptcy, 
theorists began to defend reorganization as an alternative method to liquidation for economically viable 
firms. Bebchuck became a reference by his method called “options approach” that gives to the firm the 
opportunity of restructuring without deviations of APR. Under this approach, all participants in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
5 However, the bankruptcy law of some countries does not maintain this top priority, putting labor and/or tax and/or another claim 
above claims of secured creditors (see Table A in Appendix A). 
6 See the arguments at page 4. 11
 
reorganization would receive certain options with respect to the new equities of the reorganized company. 
The division of value would result from the participants’ own decisions concerning the exercise of the 
options given to them. The options would be designed so that, whatever the reorganized value of the firm, no 
participants would ever be able to complain that they would end up with less than the value to which they are 
entitled. This approach would be capable to reduce the frequency of type I error and to improve the 
efficiency of asset allocation. However, this view seems like to be changing again. Recently, several theorists 
of bankruptcy law have alerted to benefits brought by reorganization procedures that allow deviations from 
APR (like Chapter 11) through the bargain procedure between debtors and creditors. 
  It has been observed since the 80’s that many Latin American countries, particularly in South 
America, have found themselves in the process of bankruptcy reforms to improve their system, aiming at 
providing a more attractive environment for business. In their majority, the main change concerns the 
creation or the improvement of the reorganization procedure, allowing specially the survival of viable 
business in financial distress. Besides, changes that reduce costs of the bankruptcy procedure were also an 
important target as in Brazil and Ecuador that simplify their legislations attempting to raise the agility of the 
procedure; and the creation of out-of-court reorganization procedure done in Brazil, Colombia, and Bolivia. 
Reaching this goal, the amount to be divided among creditors tends to increase, reducing the cost of capital.   
Chile was the first to reform its system at the beginning of the 80’s. The new law clearly defined the 
rights of each creditor and replaced public officials for private officials. The first change operates to improve 
the forecast of creditors’ return in insolvency states; the second change reduces the bureaucracy, cost and 
time of the process. The reform diminished the cost of capital, raised investments and the efficiency, fostered 
a large ratio private credit/GDP and growth, all factors very important to the economy. Moreover, a good 
guarantee system, like mortgage for housing, and an efficient enforcement procedure support the well 
functioning of Chilean bankruptcy law. However, Chile still has many negative aspects in its insolvency 
system. The current law does not have the objective to keep viable business alive (high possibility of type I 
error); does not provide incentives to creditors in monitoring debtors (more possibility of fraud); the average 12
 
time of the procedure is (still) too long; it misses specialized courts in bankruptcy etc. All these problems 
motivate new recommendations
7 to reform the Chilean bankruptcy system.  
In 1994 the Mexican bankruptcy law from 1943 proved to be insufficient to respond effectively to the 
problems provided by the economic crisis and a new commercial bankruptcy law began to be considered. 
The new law that passed in May 2000 was designed to provide restructuring for commercial debtors as an 
alternative for viable distressed firms and an orderly liquidation of the estate, if necessary. Both measures 
work to increase the return of the insolvent firm. The first one gives the opportunity to efficient firms to keep 
themselves alive, improving the balance between liquidation and reorganization and therefore reducing 
filtering failure problems – which enhance the efficiency of the production factors–; and the second one 
avoids the inefficient dismantlement of the firms’ asset caused by the uncoordinated debt collection. Even if 
it may seem that the new law favors restructuring, a careful reading reveals that the reform may be pro-
liquidation, looking to strengthen creditors’ rights and enhance resource allocation (both liquidation and 
restructuring were secondary)
8. Some of the most important features of the reform were that: the federal 
district court is given original and exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases; the Federal Institute of 
Bankruptcy Specialists (“IFECOM”) was created to supervise insolvency administrators and establish rules 
of procedures for insolvency cases (good at first sight); guidelines were established for the administration and 
disposition of the bankruptcy estate; and  international cooperation is facilitated by the adoption, with the 
reciprocity clause, of UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvencies. The negative aspect is that the 
whole process is too bureaucratic and very dependent on the IFECOM. 
The Argentinean bankruptcy law, differently from Brazil and Mexico, suffered several changes in few 
years. In a period of seven years three reforms occurred. The current legal framework for corporate 
insolvency is concentrated on the Ley de Concursos y Quiebras (LCQ hereinafter) of 1995, which replaced 
the previous bankruptcy system that ruled from 1972 to 1995. The most recent law provides for both 
                                                           
7 See “Análisis y Recomendaciones para una Reforma de la Ley de Quiebras”, by Claudio Bonilla, Ronald Fischer, Rolf Lüders, 
Rafael Mery, José Tagle.  
8 The authors appreciate Sara Castellanos’ comments that were very useful to clarify this issue.  13
 
liquidation and reorganization proceedings, allowing the possibility of rescue of viable business and closing 
the inefficient ones. This change impacts positively on the aggregated economic efficiency and on filtering 
failure problem. Modified on several occasions, the new law establishes a liquidation proceeding with 
generally modern features and a reorganization proceeding that is reasonably modern and largely consistent 
with the best practices. These modifications tend to reduce the time of the procedure and its cost, increasing 
the expected return of creditors and credit market. In February 2002, on the occasion of external crises, an 
emergency law was enacted in Argentina to help stabilize the corporate sector, where many firms which were 
indebted in dollar went into bankruptcy and then were passing the control to creditors (usually Banks). The 
main change is that such law imposed moratoria on different enforcement actions and precautionary 
measures of almost all kinds of creditors. Despite the attitude to preserve interests of corporation in a period 
of serious crises, this reform may bring serious damage to the reputation related to the bankruptcy law, and 
since creditors see this attitude as a reduction of the chance of being repaid in bankruptcy states, it may 
increase the cost of capital. In May 2002, a new reform was introduced which abrogated most of the 
emergency measures.  
The Brazilian reform was the most recent in the region, in force since June 2005. The former law that 
was enacted in 1945 was very fragmented. In practice the insolvency process always proved to be ineffective 
at maximizing asset values and protecting creditor rights in liquidation (see table 1). Both forces make capital 
costs very high. This could explain the bad situation of Brazilian credit market (see figures 1 and 2). The new 
law improves on existing legislation by providing an option to reorganize in (inspired in Chapter 11 of the 
U.S Bankruptcy Code) or out of court, and striking a reasonable balance between liquidation and 
reorganization that reduces the type I error. Also, changes that look to raise creditors’ protection and improve 
the role of creditors in bankruptcy procedure were pursued, making credit cheaper and easier to get, with 
positive consequences in the development of the economy. Additionally, these measures pro-creditors work 
against fraud of managers. This paper will focus specially on the Brazilian bankruptcy reform, analyzing the 
main changes and difficulties of the reform, such as its potential effects over the economy. 14
 
The remainder of this work is organized as follows: Section 2 presents how the literature of 
bankruptcy theory evolves and what the current discussion is. Also, macro direct and indirect consequences 
of a successful reform that improves the bankruptcy procedure are discussed. Section 3 begins with a 
description of a simple model that captures economic effects and trade-offs involved in the bankruptcy law, 
showing how changes in the system could impact on a firm’s investment, effort and other choices. Then, 
using data from World Bank
9 and IMF (IFS), in section 4 we take a picture of the Latin American situation to 
evaluate bankruptcy procedures by comparison with other groups of countries, in addition to testing 
empirically the effects that come from the quality of the bankruptcy law. In section 5 we discuss the Brazilian 
bankruptcy reform, emphasizing on its main changes and effects over the economic environment. In addition, 
the appendix presents the experience of one of the authors with this process, describing what he wanted to do 
but did not succeed, policy lessons that the Brazilian case provides and what other Latin American countries 
have to keep in mind when they reform their bankruptcy law. Section 6 concludes. 
II – Review of the Literature 
Modern bankruptcy theory began with the recognition of the collective action problem among creditors of an 
insolvent firm.  Jackson (1986) stresses this “common pool” problem. He argues that despite the objective of 
maximizing the value of the failing firms’ assets, creditors tend to act in their own self-interest, making an 
uncoordinated debt collection possible, which proves very costly to the value of the firm. This happens 
because if unsecured creditors perceive that a firm is insolvent, they anticipate that it will not be able to repay 
all its creditors in full, giving them an incentive to race against each other to be first to collect from the firm. 
When creditors act uncoordinatedly in liquidation, the assets are sold piecemeal, disrupting the firm’s 
operations and probably forcing it to shut down even when the best use of its assets is continued operation
10, 
bringing social-welfare losses and not maximizing the firm’s value. Moreover, such conflict delays the 
liquidation resolution, which leads to additional losses in the firm’s value. A bankruptcy system can avoid 
                                                           
9 Doing Business database 2003 and 2004 and World Development Indicators 2004. 
10 Webb (1991) shows that this is a classical case of prisoner’s dilemma. 15
 
this inefficient equilibrium by staying the creditors’ collection effort to give a state official time to decide 
whether the firm is worth saving. 
The ensuing debate attempted to specify how a bankruptcy law should do its job. The early economic 
view tried to avoid deviations from the absolute-priority rule as well as to cut costs associated with the 
bargaining present in the reorganization procedure called Chapter 11. Some of the economic theorists, such 
as Baird (1986) and Jensen (1991), were favorable to a market-auctions approach to cut costs implicit at 
reorganization. More concretely, a state official would auction insolvent firms to the market, free of current 
claims, distributing the proceeds to creditors according to absolute-priority rules. If economic value would be 
maximized by a piecemeal liquidation, the highest bids would be for individual assets; if continuing the firm 
as an economic entity, it would maximize value, then the highest bids would be for the firm as a unit.   
Bebchuck (1988) argues that reorganization can capture a greater value than the liquidation process, 
especially when the assets of a company are worth much more as a going concern than if sold piecemeal, and 
if there are few or no buyers with both accurate information about the company and sufficient resources to 
acquire it. He, therefore, proposed an optional approach that homogenizes the interest of the holders and 
follows the Absolute Priority Rule, keeping alive the reorganization procedure without the burden of APR 
violations and the cost of bargain.  
Bebchuck’s idea received some significant support in subsequent literature; for example, it was 
adapted as the basis for bankruptcy reform in proposals by Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992), who combined it 
with auction, and by Hart, La Porta, Silanes and Moore (1997), who suggested a new procedure using 
multiple auctions. These procedures have also received their share of critical or skeptical reactions. The 
criticism is about the lack of liquidity (since the firms are in financial distress) what makes impossible for 
shareholders to exercise their options; and the skeptical reaction is due to the complexity that makes it 
difficult for the implementation of Aghion et al (1992) and Hart et al (1997) proposals.    16
 
  Therefore, early theorists held that bankruptcy systems should follow absolute priority strictly. This 
requires creditors to be repaid so that the firm’s contracts were created. An implication of the rule is that 
equity holders should receive nothing because the residual claim on an insolvent firm is worth nothing. 
Modern theory relates the results of a bankruptcy procedure to earlier stages in the life of the 
borrowing firm. An ex-post efficient bankruptcy system maximizes the pay-off that creditors receive from 
insolvent firms. Turning to the borrowing stage, a competitive credit market would reduce the amounts that 
lenders can require solvent firms to repay when the lenders’ expected insolvency pay-offs increase. Thus, 
interest rates fall as the efficiency of the applicable bankruptcy system increases. On the other hand, the ex-
ante efficiency of the bankruptcy system is related to the optimal division of the firm’s total value. This point 
of research is the main target of the current discussion.  
We saw that much of the research on bankruptcy procedures and reform had assumed that the 
absolute-priority rule was the optimal division and had focused on procedures that could secure this rule. 
However, some substantial research has already been done on violations of the absolute-priority rule (APR), 
highlighting that the ex-ante effect of deviations from APR are actually beneficial. In particular, this line of 
research has shown that deviations from APR encourage desirable ex-ante investments in firm-specific 
human capital as in Berkovitch, Israel and Zender (1997); that they facilitate the transfer of information to 
creditors and improve the timing of decisions to file for bankruptcy, to liquidate, or to recapitalize as in Povel 
(1999) and Berkovitch and Israel (1999); and that they discourage excessive risk-taking by financially 
distressed firms as in Eberhart and Senbet (1993). Recently Bebchuck (2002) showed that ex-post deviations 
from APR also have negative effects on ex-ante decisions made by shareholders. He argues that such 
deviations have an adverse effect on ex-ante management decisions made prior to the onset of financial 
distress. The presence of APR deviations aggravates the moral-hazard problem but the final effect of such 
deviations is still inconclusive. 
Also, direct and indirect consequences of a bankruptcy-law improvement are being investigated in the 
macroeconomic field. The first direct macro implication holds that reducing the cost of debt capital will 17
 
reduce the cost of capital generally. The equity holds a call option on a levered firm because shareholders can 
buy the firm by repaying the debt. The strike price for exercising the equity option is therefore the firm’s cost 
of credit.  Reducing this cost – i.e., reducing the strike price – makes stock more valuable to own. Hence, it 
becomes easier for firms to raise equity capital as their country’s bankruptcy system becomes more efficient.   
The second direct implication of reducing the cost of capital by an improvement in the bankruptcy 
system is the expansion of the credit market (reduction on credit constraint). La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) present an important empirical study about legal systems and their influence in 
finance. They show that a bankruptcy law and an enforcement mechanism that protect the rights of creditors 
tend to generate more financial development. Araujo and Funchal (2004) examining the same relation argue 
that when the protection of creditors implies penalization of debtors, an extremely high level of protection 
reduces debtors’ interest in demanding credit, fearing possible consequences
11. Notice that the supply of 
credit is increasing in creditors’ protection because of the moral-hazard problem, while on the other hand the 
demand for credit is decreasing in creditors’ protection due to the fear of punishment. So there exists an 
intermediary level of creditor protection (neither too strong nor too weak) that provides the maximal level of 
credit in the economy. 
  However, this relationship is just a first-order consequence of the bankruptcy law. The most important 
impacts of an improvement of the law are second-order, that is, the consequences generated by financial 
development. They are two-fold: one is the impact of financial development on growth and the other is the 
impact on income distribution and poverty. 
King and Levine (1993) study the impact on growth empirically with a sample of 77 countries over 
the period 1960-1989, using different measures of financial development and growth indicators. The result 
indicates a strong, positive relationship between each financial-development and growth indicators. The 
authors confirm these findings using alternative methods of robustness checks. 
                                                           
11 This is valid only if markets are incomplete. Otherwise, when markets are complete, there always exists the asset of promising to 
repay only in cases of success.   18
 
  However, they do not deal formally with the issue of causality. It may be the case that financial 
markets develop in anticipation of future economic activity. To solve the possible problem of simultaneity 
bias, Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) use La Porta et al (1998) measures of legal origin as instrumental 
variables. They analyze 71 countries, using two different econometric techniques: GMM dynamic-panel 
estimators and a cross-sectional instrumental-variable estimator. The results indicate a very strong connection 
between the exogenous component of financial development and economic growth. They use various 
measures of financial-development and conditioning-information sets. Furthermore the data do not reject 
legal origin as a good instrument for financial development. These results indicate that the strong link 
between financial development and growth is not due to simultaneity bias.   
  With regard to the relationship between financial development and both income distribution and 
poverty alleviation, the theory provides conflicting predictions. Some theorists claim that a financial-
intermediary development makes financial services available to a lager portion of the population, rather than 
restricting capital to selective groups. Thus, by ameliorating credit constraint, financial development may 
foster entrepreneurship, formation of new firms and economic growth. On the other hand, some argue that it 
is primarily the rich and politically connected who benefit from improvements to the financial system.   
Especially at early stages of economic development, access to financial services, especially credit, is limited 
to wealthy and connected persons. Thus, it is an open question whether financial development will narrow or 
widen income disparities even if it boosts economic growth. 
  Other theorists analyze the relationship between financial development and income distribution as a 
non-linear form. Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) show that the interaction of financial-intermediaries 
development and income inequalities can give rise to an inverted U-shape curve. At early stages of financial 
development, only a few relatively wealthy individuals have access to the financial market and hence higher 
return projects.  With the aggregate economic growth generated, more people can afford to join the financial 
system with more positive consequences on economic growth.  The distributed effect of financial deepening 
is thus adverse to the poor at early stages, but positive after the turning point. 19
 
  Using cross-country regressions, a very recent research by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2004) 
examines whether the level of financial-intermediaries development influences the growth rate of Gini 
coefficients of income inequality, the growth rate of the income of the poorest quintile of society, and the 
fraction of the population living in poverty.  The results indicate that finance exerts a disproportionately large 
and positive impact on the poor and hence reduces income inequality.  
III – Bankruptcy Law: Economic Issues and Trade-offs 
III. 1 – The ex-ante financial distress effects 
The relevance of a good bankruptcy law is not present only when a firm goes bankrupt. It also has strong ex-
ante effects on cost of capital and incentive to pursue projects that are as important as the ex-post bankruptcy 
effects. The relationship between the performance of the bankruptcy system, a firm's cost of capital and its 
incentive and ability to pursue projects can be exhibited with a simple model that we describe as follows. 
There are five important assumptions: 
1 – The borrowing firm is run by an owner/manager. 
2 – Creditors are imperfect monitors of actions related to pay-offs that the firm takes after it borrows. 
3 – Capital markets are competitive. 
4 – Creditors can predict the mean of their pay-offs in the default state. 
5 – Creditors and the firm are risk-neutral. 
Assumption 1 is made because this essay is not concerned with the corporative-governance problem. 
Assumption 2 captures the asymmetric information between the firm and its creditors. Assumption 3 is 
realistic. Assumption 4 rests on the view that professional creditors have considerable experience with 
default and 5 is more accurate when applied to firms than to individual persons. 
The borrowing firm has a project that requires capital of I, which the firm must raise externally. The 
firm promises to repay creditors the sum F. The project can return a value v, where the firm is solvent if v ≥ F 
and insolvent if v < F. There are two states of nature in the future, one if the firm is solvent and the other if it 
is not.  20
 
The solvency and the insolvency state of nature returns to the firm vsolv and vins respectively, where 
vsolv ≥ F > vins. The probability of solvency is psolv and the insolvency probability is (1 – psolv). This implies 
that the expected value of the project is ins solv solv solv v p v p v E ) 1 ( ) ( − + = , the expected return conditional to 
solvency state is  , ) ( solv solv v v E =  and the expected return conditional to insolvency state is   . ) ( ins ins v v E =  
The bankruptcy system costs c to run. A bankruptcy system can thus distribute to the creditors of an insolvent 
firm at most the sum vins – c. Therefore the repayment to creditors is F if solvent and vins – c if it goes 
bankrupt. 
Because the credit market is competitive, F is the largest sum that creditors can demand to fund the 
project. The risk-free interest rate is assumed to be zero, so that a borrowing firm's interest rate is a function 
only of the riskiness of its project and the properties of the bankruptcy system that is in place. 
Investment Problem 
Creditors who lend I should expect to receive I in return. This expectation can be written as: 
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  If the expected value that creditors receive conditional to insolvency increases (higher [vins – c]), F 
declines, diminishing the interest rate charged by creditors. Intuitively, the more that creditors expect to 
receive in the insolvency state, the less creditors will require the firm to repay in the solvency state. The 
firm's interest rate is  , 1 − = I
F r  that is increasing in F, which is the value that the firm is required to repay in 
solvency state. Denoting by v
u
ins and c
u the per-unit-of-investment (I = 1) counterparts of vins and c we also 
have: 










 that is decreasing in the probability of success and/or in the return of insolvency states.   
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Proposition 1: A higher (lower) expectation of return in the insolvency state reduces (raises) the interest 
rates charged by the creditors. 
The bankruptcy system affects both elements that compose the return in case of insolvency (v and c). 
Agility in the bankruptcy procedure decreases the cost of the procedure (c) and brings ex-ante gains. 
Moreover, the return is affected by the procedure choice. If the return in reorganization (liquidation) is 
greater than in liquidation (reorganization) ) ) ( ( L R v v < > , the firm should be reorganized (liquidated). Thus, 
the firm's insolvency-state value is higher in a system that liquidates economically inefficient firms and saves 
economically efficient (but financially distressed) firms than it would be in a system that attempted to save or 
liquidate all firms. 
Obviously, F, and thus r, also will increase if creditors receive only a fraction of the insolvency return 
(vins – c). Two characteristics of bankruptcy law may affect the insolvency return in this way. First, if 
reorganization is allowed, violations of the Absolute-Priority Rule may occur, with some portion of value in 
bankruptcy going to shareholders even when creditors are not paid in full. The second characteristic happens 
when the bankruptcy law decrees the priority of tax and/or labor claims over secured creditors' claims, very 
common in developing countries.  
Suppose that l is the value of claims that came before creditors' claims or the expected amount that 
shareholders extract in insolvency states, thus: 
] 0 , [ max ) 1 ( l c v p F p I ins solv
l
solv − − − + ⋅ =  
Defining [vins – c – l]
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Notice that creditors' return may fall in this situation to zero, strongly increasing the cost of capital. 
 Proposition 2: Violations in APR and priority of labor and/or tax claims over creditors’ claims increase the 
cost of capital. 22
 
An ex-ante objective of bankruptcy law should be to maximize the project option set that creditors 
want to finance.  Lower cost of capital is fundamental to this objective. 
Society prefers firms that pursue projects with positive expected returns. Denoting W as social 
welfare, a firm should therefore undertake a project that creates value, i.e.   
0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
0 ] )[ 1 (
≥ − − − + =
≥ − − − + =
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I c v p v p W
ins solv solv solv
ins solv solv solv
 
As there always exists a minimum conditional expectation value of return  )) ( (
− v Esolv  needed for social 
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  Since (1) solves for the minimum-repayment promise the firm must make to obtain financing and (2) 
solves for the minimum conditional expected return socially accepted, we have that it is socially efficient for 
firms to take all projects that creditors will finance. More precisely, since  ) (
− v Esolv  is the minimum return 
conditional to solvency states accepted by the society, they will take every project that 
makes ) ( ) (
− ≥ v E v E solv solv , and consequently debtors will be able to fulfill their promises in solvency states 
since (1) = (2). Notice that if there are deviations from APR and/or claims with priority above creditors' 
claims, F would be higher and this equality no longer holds, with certain socially efficient projects not being 
financed. If the project returns ) ( ) (
− ≥ v E v E solv solv , and if F v Esolv < ) ( , despite the project creates value (W > 
0) – being accepted to the society – creditors would not be fully repaid for sure (i.e. there are no solvency 
states), eliminating their appeal in financing such projects. Therefore, projects with return between 
)) ( ), ( [
F
solv solv v E v E , where  F v E
F
solv = ) ( , despite being socially efficient they would be no longer financed 
by creditors.   
(2) 23
 
 Proposition 3: If creditors' claims have top priority and if there are no APR violations, then all socially 
efficient projects are financed. 
 Proposition 4: If APR violations are allowed and/or other claims come above creditors' claims, then there is 
a set of socially efficient projects that would not be financed. 
Until now we have studied the set of projects that are socially efficient, but it is important to see the 
borrowers’ incentives to invest.  The interest rate imposes on firms the expected costs of failure so that a 
firm's expected return, when it borrows, becomes under APR: 
0 ) 0 )( 1 ( ] [ ) ( ≥ − + − = solv solv solv
B p F v p R E  
0 ) ) ( ( ) ( ≥ − = F v E p R E solv solv
B  
Substituting for F from expression (1) we have: 
0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ≥ − − − + = I c v E p v E p R E ins solv solv solv
B , 
which is the expression that tells us that the project is socially efficient. For the minimum conditional 
expected return  ), (
− v Esolv  this equation holds with equality. Therefore, the borrower invests in all projects that 
creditors will finance and which are socially efficient. 
 Proposition 5: If creditors' claims have top priority and if there are no APR violations, a profit-maximizing 
firm will pursue projects that creditors will finance and which are socially efficient. 
Moral-Hazard Problem 
Now let us introduce an asymmetric-information problem that refers to the effort level that firms 
financing with debt choose when pursuing projects. As the variable effort is not observed by creditors, it is 
difficult for them to know whether a borrowing firm chose the optimal effort level. Until now we have 
implicitly assumed that the probability that the firm's project would succeed, psolv, was exogenous, therefore 
psolv did not depend on what the firm did. More realistically, when we consider effort in the problem we 
assume that the probability of success increases with the firm's effort level. In precise terms, it is assumed 





→ ) ( lim 0 e psolv e , meaning that it is efficient for the firm to choose a positive effort level and that 
1 ) ( < ∞ solv p  for the insolvency state is always possible. 
The effort level, despite increasing the probability of the firm's success, is costly to the manager 
(borrower). The first problem emerges because the socially optimal effort is different from the optimal 
private effort.  From the social perspectives we have: 
e
max W  psolvevsolv  1  psolve  vins  c  e  I
 
psolv
 esoc  1
vsolv  vins  c  
The effort socially optimal is the level of effort that makes equal the marginal gains from the higher 
probability of success and the marginal cost to exert such an effort.  
From the manager’s perspective we have: 
e
max W  psolve vsolv  F  1  psolve  0  e
 
psolv
 epriv  1
vsolv  F  
The manager exerts effort until its marginal private gain from the higher probability of success is 
equal to its marginal cost to exert such an effort. The difference between the social and private problem 
appears because the firm divides its gain with creditors in the success state while the marginal cost is the 
same to both. Therefore, since  c v F ins − >   (otherwise the firm is solvent)  ) ( ) ( soc solv priv solv e p e p
′ ′ > , which 
implies that  . soc priv e e <   
 Proposition 6: Any bankruptcy system produces an effort lower than the socially optimal. 
Notice that some characteristics of bankruptcy law could reduce the private level of effort exerted by 
managers. First, let us consider the case where the law puts tax and/or labor claims before creditors' claims. 
As we saw above, this diminishes creditors' gains in insolvency states, making the payment in solvency states 25
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∗  reducing the 
private level of effort. Intuitively, closer pay-offs reduce the incentive to avoid insolvency states. In the 
second situation, let us consider a bankruptcy system that allows violations of APR.  Suppose that managers 
extract l in insolvency states, thus: 
e l e p F v e p W solv
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∗ ∗   also reducing the private level 
of effort. Intuitively when managers get a payoff in insolvency states, they have less incentive to avoid it 
creating a moral-hazard problem. 
 Proposition 7: The private level of effort is reduced when the bankruptcy system gives priority to tax and/or 
labor claims over creditors' claims and when managers are paid in insolvency states. 
Sub-investment in effort exacerbates the financing problem shown before. The probability of success 
declines as the firm exerts less effort, making the minimum conditional expectation value of return increase 
and shrinks the set of fundable projects. 
III. 2 – The ex-post financial distress and ex-ante bankruptcy effects 
Now suppose that some firms have become financially distressed, but have not filed for bankruptcy.         
Managers of failing firms may incur two types of effect: the gambling effect that occurs when managers 
attempt to avoid bankruptcy and the delay effect when managers attempt to delay filing for bankruptcy. 
The Gambling Effect 
This refers to the fact that managers of firms in financial distress have an incentive to undertake 
excessively risky investments as a means of avoiding bankruptcy. If risky investment succeeds, its high 
returns enable the firm to avoid bankruptcy, at least temporarily; if it fails, the firm goes bankruptcy but 
managers are no worse off since it would have done so anyway without the investment, since managers 26
 
cannot get less than zero, which is what they take in case of bankruptcy. Equity holders are also in favor of 
risky investments in this situation of financial distress, since equity is likely to be worth zero if bankruptcy 
occurs. Losses on risky investment go to creditors in the form of lower pay-off in bankruptcy, with the same 
pay-off holding in solvent state. 
Let us consider now a multi-period model following the model used in an earlier section
12. At time t 
= 0 the firm borrows I > 0, and agrees to pay F  )) 1 ( ( r I F + =  in solvency states. At time t = 1 the firm enters 
financial distress, but it still owns an amount  0 > Z   ) ( F Z <  in cash that the manager will use to make a 
choice between two projects, one risky and another risk-free. Finally at t = 2, the firm's final output v is 
realized, and this is divided between equity holders and creditors. All the hypotheses of section III.1 still 
hold. 
If managers choose the risk-free project, then the final output v will be Z, where  ). 1 ( r I F Z + = < If 
they choose the risky project instead, then the final output v will be  , R γ  where R is the expected return, 
which is positive, and  a random variable with expected value equal to 1. Let  be distributed discretely in 
the interval ] , 0 [
_
γ , where  . 1
_
> γ At t = 1 the equity holders observe R and the range, but the value of  is 
realized in t = 2. 
It is assumed that given the information available in t = 0, the parties know Z but only the distribution 
of R in [0, R]. The risky project may offer a higher or lower expected return than the risk-free project. The 
moral-hazard problem is that equity holders may choose the risky project even if R < Z. At t = 2 the final 
output is realized and divided between equity holders and creditors. Assuming APR
13, and that the cost to run 
bankruptcy is zero (c = 0), if the firm is solvent equity holders receive v – F and creditors F. Otherwise, if the 
firm is insolvent, equity holders receive nothing (because v < F) and creditors receive v. Therefore, the return 
for equity holders is  ] 0 , max[ F v −  and for creditors is  ]. , min[ v F   
                                                           
12 The model follows Bebchuck (2002). 
13Later we will see the effect of APR violations. 27
 
Let us see how managers decide between projects at t = 1. Once managers observe the value of R and 
its distribution, they will choose the risky project if and only if: 
E maxR I1  r,0  maxZ  I1  r,0  
Let  RAPr be the smallest non-negative value of R that makes the left- and right-hand sides of (4) 
equal. Equity holders will choose the risky project if and only if  . AP R R ≥   
If there exists any risky project with expected value equal to R ≤ Z that does not always lead to 
insolvency ( ) 1 ( r I R + > γ  in some state of nature), it makes the left-hand side strictly greater than the right-
hand side and it is preferred by the managers over the risk-free project. This happens because since we are 
working with choices after the firm enters a financial distress, we have  ) 1 ( r I Z + < and 
0 ] 0 ), 1 ( max[ = + − r I Z  as the return to equity holders for the risk-free project, then by construction 
. 0 ) ( = r RAP  It follows that for any given r,  Z r RAP < ) (( s i n c e   RAP = 0 and Z > 0). This inequality implies that 
managers may choose the risky project even if R < Z, it suffices to satisfy R > 0 and  ) 1 ( r I R + > γ  in some 
state of nature. 
Then, equity holders may choose the risky project inefficiently because they have more gain from a 
favorable outcome of this project than they have to lose from an unfavorable outcome. 
 Proposition 8: If a firm is in financial distress and the Bankruptcy System follows APR, managers will 
undertake risky projects even if this produces economic costs () . 0 > − R Z  
Now suppose that the reorganization procedure is available, allowing deviations from APR. In this 
case equity holders will be able to obtain some value regardless of how small v turns out to be. If the firm is 
in financial distress  )), 1 ( ( r I Z + <  equity holders will be able to obtain  v α  (where  ). 0 > α  Moreover, by 
using or threatening to use the reorganization procedure
14, equity holders will be able to get more than their 
contractual right if the firm is sufficiently close to insolvency, that is if v exceeds  ) 1 ( r I +  by a sufficiently 
                                                           




15. For simplicity, it will be assumed that the equity holders will always be able to get at least 
v α  even if their contractual right  ) 1 ( r I v + −  is less than that. On the other hand, debt holders will not get 
full payment but only  ). 1 ( ) 1 ( r I v − < −α Thus, if violations of APR are allowed, equity holders will receive 
] ), 1 ( max[ v r I v α + −  and creditors will receive  ]. ) 1 ( ), 1 ( min[ v r I α − +  
Let us see how managers decide between projects at t = 1. They will choose the risky project if and 
only if: 
E maxR I1  r,R  maxZ  I1  r,Z  
Let RVAP (r) denote the value of R that makes left- and right-hand sides of (5) equal. Equity holders 
will choose the risky project if and only if R ≥ RVAP (r). Let us compare the project choices at  1 = t  at two 
regimes. 
Once the firm is in financial distress, we have ) 1 ( r I Z + < , thus  . ] ), 1 ( max[ Z R r I R E α αγ γ γ ≥ + −  The 
left-hand side of (5) is strictly greater than the left-hand side of (4), since  . 0 > Z α  Furthermore, with RAP = 0 
the left- and right-hand sides of (4) are equal and therefore 
, 0 ] 0 ), 1 ( max[ ] ), 1 ( max[ = + − > = + − r I R E Z R r I R E VA VAP VAP γ α αγ γ γ γ  where the first equality holds with   
RVAP > 0 because  , 0 > Z α  and the second holds with  . 0 ) ( = r RAP  Thus, since RVAP > RAP, the set of risky 
projects available to the equity holders decreases, diminishing the investment in risky projects relative to the 
bankruptcy system that does not provide reorganization, and always follows APR. Notice that under both 
regimes the equity holders capture benefits of favorable outcome of the risky project, however when APR 
violations are allowed, safe investments also provide gains for equity holders, and this reduces the set of 
risky projects that they could invest with higher expected gains, decreasing the amount of risky investment 
when compared with the regime that follows APR. 
                                                           






 Proposition 9: When firms are financially distressed, the amount of investment in risky projects is higher in 
regimes that always follow APR than in regimes that allow APR deviations. 
Thus, the availability of a reorganization procedure like Chapter 11 diminishes managers’ incentive to 
invest in inefficient and risky projects.  
Now, to see the aggregated gambling effect in the economy, let us denote  R Z G − =  the economic 
cost per failing firm. Suppose that 1  psolv is the probability that a firm is financially distressed and N the 
total number of firms. Therefore the aggregated gambling effect is  . ) 1 ( NG psolv −  But notice that 
1  psolve is negatively related to the effort e by managers, since higher effort is less likely to be in 
financial distress. Therefore there is a trade-off in bankruptcy between the punishment effect and the 
gambling effect. As we saw in the earlier section, managers have an incentive to work hard when there are no 
pay-offs in bankruptcy states (APR). This makes fewer firms in financial distress because once  ) (e psolv  
increases, the proportion of firms in financial distress ( ) ) 1 ( N psolv − ↓ reduces. However, once firms are in 
financial distress, this system gives the manager the incentive to gamble to avoid bankruptcy, making G high. 
On the other hand, a lenient bankruptcy system that violates APR makes the effort smaller than the former, 
thus increasing the proportion of firms in financial distress. However, this system gives the manager the 
incentive to gamble less than the hard system. The final effect is ambiguous with a trade-off between effort 
and the incentive to gamble. If we consider the system that gives priority to other claims instead of creditors' 
claims, the final result is no longer ambiguous because it provides the negative effect in effort (proposition 7) 
and does not diminish the gamble of equity holders since they still gain nothing in insolvency state, therefore 
the proportion of financially distressed firms increases and the gamble remains constant, thereby increasing 
the aggregate gamble effect. 
The Delay Effect 
This refers to the fact that managers of financially distressed firms have an incentive to delay filing 
for bankruptcy, in particular if they are automatically replaced in bankruptcy. 30
 
To analyze effects of APR violations it is necessary to introduce one more source of asymmetric 
information, where the two types of asymmetric information are the manager's effort choice and at an 
intermediate stage the manager alone receiving a signal about the prospects of his project. The idea is to 
analyze the trade-offs between these two conflicting goals. On the one hand, creditors want a bankruptcy 
procedure to be harsh on the borrower, following APR, as a severe punishment may increase the borrower's 
incentive to generate sufficient earnings to repay. On the other hand, creditors want to prevent the waste of 
resources that takes place if a rescue is necessary but not undertaken in time. The method to obtain this 
information is to reward for poor outcomes. This reward should be bigger (or at least equal) to the pecuniary 
gains that managers would receive during the delay period in such a way to incentive them to declare the 
financial problems at the right time. However, this works against effort incentives aggravating the moral-
hazard problem because it diminishes the punishment in bad states of nature. It is not clear a priori whether 
one of the incentive problems is more relevant.    
Let us consider a multi-period model variant of the earlier model
16. In period 1 the manager must 
invest an amount I, which is lent by creditors. The manager must invest effort e, which creditors cannot 
observe. In period 2 the project type is realized and there are three possible states of nature: the project is a 
success with probability  ) (e psolv  and return  ) ( solv s v ; the project is bad with probability  )) ( 1 ( e p q solv −  with 
return  ); ( ) ( solv bad s v s v <  and with probability  )) ( 1 )( 1 ( e p q solv − −  the project is a failure and returns  ). ( f s v  
The firm agrees to repay lenders F where  ), ( ) ( ) ( f bad solv s v s v F s v > > >  thus the firm is solvent only if the 
project succeeds with or without rescue. 
In period 3, the project can be rescued by buying information from managers at a cost y. This attitude 
could be necessary to implement changes
17 in the firm to help it to improve the possibility of success. If the 
project type is bad, the project becomes a good project, otherwise it does not change. The failed project must 
                                                           
16 The analysis follows Povel (1999). 




be liquidated. In period 4 the information becomes public. The failed project that was not rescued in period 3 
must be liquidated but the delay depreciates liquidation value by δ, and the non-rescued bad project becomes 
good with probability g  (the wait-and-pray strategy), and fails with probability 1 – g, while a bad project that 
is rescued becomes good with probability G and fails with probability 1 – G, where G > g. Finally, in period 
5 the verifiables are earned and if the manager stays all the periods he earns private benefit b, otherwise if he 
is excluded because the liquidation or reorganization (in this case the manager is replaced) the manager stops 
receiving the pecuniary gains in the third period.  
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reward is bigger than his gains from delay) 
Now let us compare the pay-offs of equity holders and creditors if the firm is rescued and not rescued. 
Not rescued (t = 5) 
 states     Payoff     Manager     Creditor  
 good     vssolv     vssolv  F  b     F  
 bad    gvssolv  1  gvsf    gvssolv  F  1  g0  b   gF  1  gvsf  
 failure     1  vsf     b     1  vsf  
Rescued (t = 5) 
 states     Payoff     Manager     Creditor  
 good     vssolv     vssolv  F  b     F  
 bad    Gvssolv  1  Gvsf    y b G F s v G solv + + − + − 5
3 ) 0 )( 1 ( ) ) ( (    GF  1  Gvsf  y 
 failure     vsf    
3
5 b  y     vsf  y  
The optimality of the APR violation depends on economic parameters indicating rescue to be good 
for both lenders and borrowers. Otherwise, if the rescue is not good for lenders they will not rescue the firm 
in insolvency state and no deviations from APR are optimal. 32
 
Lets begin with the effect on manager effort comparing the level that they exerted in both cases. 
If rescue occurs: 
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If rescue does not occur: 
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Therefore, the level of effort chosen by the managers is bigger when there is no rescue.   
Now let us analyze when lenders have incentive to rescue the insolvent firm. Their expected returns in 
case of rescue and non-rescue are: 
 ERl
R  peRF  1  peRqGF  1  Gvsf  1  qvsf  y   
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Comparative static says more about some elements in trade-off and in which type of economy APR 
violations are optimal. Notice that: 
•  , 0 > ∂
∆ ∂
G
E  means that rescue is more (less) valuable when the chance of success in rescue is higher (lower). 
•  , 0 > ∂
∆ ∂
δ
E  means that rescue is more (less) valuable when the depreciation rate is higher (lower). 
•  , 0 < ∂
∆ ∂
y
E  means that rescue is more (less) valuable when the information rent is lower (higher). 
•  , 0 )) ( ( > − ∂
∆ ∂
f s v F
E  means that rescue is more (less) valuable when the net gain to be solvent is higher (lower). 33
 




l R E R E >  there is a positive gain of APR violations, otherwise 




l R E R E < , no gains exist in such violations being optimal following APR.      
In summary, the optimal procedure depends on the parameters of the economy. A bankruptcy system 
that allows APR violations rewards the entrepreneur if he cooperates in a rescue by starting early. This 
reward violates APR because it must be paid even if some of the firm’s debt is not paid in full. This 
procedure allows an efficient rescue or an efficient early liquidation, mitigating the delay effect. On the other 
hand it does not induce the firm to exert the right effort because the firm receives a non-zero pay-off in bad 
states. Therefore the optimal procedure depends on which incentive it is more important to the parties to 
encourage: optimal effort, at the cost of foregoing the opportunity of an efficient early intervention, or 
optimal disclosure at a cost of reducing the incentive to effort.    
  To see the aggregate effect consider A = losses of delay per insolvent firm. As the number of firms in 
financial distress is N e psolv )) ( 1 ( − , the total cost of delay is NA e psolv )) ( 1 ( − . As in gambling, a bankruptcy 
law with strong punishment to debtors raises their incentive to work hard ( N e psolv )) ( 1 ( − ↓ ) but with 
negative effect in delay declaring bankruptcy (↑A). On the other hand a lenient bankruptcy system leads to 
the opposite result. The final effect is ambiguous with a trade-off between effort and the incentive to delay. If 
we consider the system that gives top priority to other claims instead of creditors’ claims, the final result is 
no longer ambiguous because it provides a negative effect in effort (proposition 7) and does not reward 
debtors to incentive optimal disclosure, increasing the proportion of financial distressed firms and remaining 
constant the delay, increasing the aggregate delay losses.             
III. 3 – The ex-post Bankruptcy Effects 
From an ex-post efficiency perspective, a bankruptcy law should maximize the total value of the company. 
There are three main elements behind this objective: first, as little value as possible should be dissipated 
during the process (minimizing the cost c), therefore it is desirable to minimize the time that the process              
will take – essentially the part of time that is spent on delay tactics of equity holders, and not the time spent 34
 
on complexity of claims – and the direct and indirect costs incurred during this process. Second, when the 
reorganizing process ends, the company's assets should be located at their highest value of use. Finally, when 
a firm enters bankruptcy the procedure should be chosen correctly, otherwise the company's assets will not 
produce their highest value. 
From an ex-ante efficiency perspective, the ex-post bankruptcy division of firms’ value among the 
participants has important ex-ante consequences as we saw in earlier sections. However, it is quite 
indeterminate whether the beneficial effects of deviations from APR exceed the negative effects.  
Here we will analyze how the characteristics of bankruptcy will affect both the maximization and the 
division of companies’ value.     
Filtering Failure 
There are two types of firms in financial distress: firms that are economically efficient, i.e. the best 
use of its capital is the current use, and firms that are economically inefficient, i.e. the value of their assets is 
greater in some other use. When an economically inefficient firm enters bankruptcy, the best outcome is for 
its assets to be liquidated, thereby releasing its capital to move to higher-value uses. On the other hand, when 
an economically efficient firm enters bankruptcy, the best outcome is for it to continue operating, since its 
capital has no higher-value use. Therefore, there is an economic justification for having two separate 
bankruptcy procedures.  
Nevertheless, while financial distress is observable, economic efficiency depends on some 
unobservable variables such as the earnings of the firm's assets in the best alternative use, so it is difficult to 
surely assert which type they are. This situation produces the so-called Filtering Failure in bankruptcy. There 
are two cases of failure: the first is when economically efficient firms in financial distress are liquidated but 
should be reorganized, which is called Type I Error; the second is when economically inefficient and 
financially distressed firms are saved in reorganization but should be liquidated, which is called Type II 
Error. 35
 
Each country has its own means of assigning financially distressed firms to a liquidation or 
reorganization procedure, so the levels of type I and type II errors vary from country to country. Countries 
where reorganization is rare, like England, have high levels of type I error probably occurring. Conversely, in 
countries where liquidation is rare, high levels of type II error probably occur. 
One important factor in filtering failure is who decides whether or nor to save failing firms. In 
countries where the court appoints officials to take this responsibility, if their decisions are unbiased, they do 
not influence the frequency of both types of error. But in countries like the United States, where managers 
have the right to choose between liquidation and reorganization, it is implied that high levels of type II error 
are likely to occur
18. 
As a general rule, ex-post efficiency requires the availability of both bankruptcy procedures, as like a 
careful balance between them. Let us suppose that a financially distressed and economically efficient firm 
goes bankrupt. The optimal solution in this case is reorganization that returns vR. But if type I error occurs, it 
returns vL  vR. This eliminates ex-post efficiency and by proposition 1 increases the cost of capital. The 
same logic is valid for type II error. 
Notice that besides the positive effect on credit market, the minimization of filtering failure also 
improves the efficiency of production factors of the economy. This happens because it allows that the most 
efficient firms continue to operate, or by the rehabilitation of firms economically efficient or by the 
liquidation that transfers the assets of firms economically inefficient to a more efficient use.    
Bargaining in Reorganization 
First of all let us consider how the features of reorganization process – like Chapter 11 – affect the 
division of value. The model of Bebchuck and Chang (1992) identifies three reasons why equity holders 
might be able to extract value even when creditors are not paid in full. First, if equity holders delay 
agreement over a plan, there may be a favorable resolution of uncertainty that would cause the value of the 
firm to exceed the value of its debt. These equity holders have an option value, and to forgo it they must be 36
 
compensated. Second, if equity holders delay agreement, the company can be expected to incur during the 
process of bargaining financial distress costs that will dissipate some of the value that debt holders can expect 
to receive at the end of the process. Therefore, expecting these costs, creditors agree with a plan to save these 
costs, obtaining a share of these savings in return for their consent. Third, which is valid only for countries 
that give management the power to propose reorganization plans (like the U.S.), the bargaining power of 
equity holders is enhanced, strengthens the bargaining position and obtains a bigger share of the extra 
value
19. 
As a consequence, this bankruptcy design provides for violations of APR and the trade-off exposed in 
earlier sections, with benefits in gambling and delay effects, but with negative result in effort incentive and 
maybe at the cost of capital. 
The reorganization process under the existing bargaining-based rules takes substantial time
20. The 
delaying tactics of equity holders and the complexity of the firm’s claims dictate the length of the process. 
During this time, substantial value might be dissipated. Potential buyers may be reluctant to deal with the 
company, or may demand especially favorable terms while insolvency hovers over the company. Moreover, 
the reorganization process involves substantial administrative costs, and more importantly, the company 
under reorganization might incur substantial "indirect" costs from functioning throughout the reorganization 
process. All these costs grow bigger as time passes. 
All these factors increase the cost in insolvency states. If the return in reorganization is v, creditors get 
v – c where c is the cost of procedure. A bankruptcy law that minimizes such costs (c
m < c) by reducing 
either the delay tactics of equity holders or the administrative and/or the indirect cost of the procedure, 
diminishes the bargain power of managers (l
m < l), which increases creditors’ return in insolvency state (v – 
c
m – l
m > v – c – l) and makes (by proposition 1) capital less costly. Notice that a reorganization procedure 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
18See White (1994), who uses an asymmetric information game to model whether U.S. Bankruptcy procedure led to filtering 
failure. 
19See Franks and Torous (1989), LoPucki and Withford (1990), and Eberhart et al (1990) for empirical studies. 




that minimizes managers’ bargain power produces the same benefits of APR violations at lower costs, where 
lower costs mean lower payment to managers ( l ) and alleviation of the moral-hazard problem related to the 
manager’s effort. 
IV – Evaluating Bankruptcy Law in Latin America 
Our challenge here is to evaluate the current stage of bankruptcy law in Latin American countries.         
Nowadays there is little to say about the design of optimal bankruptcy law. However, there exist two 
consensual points in this debate. One refers to the protection that bankruptcy law must provide to creditors, 
and the other is about the goals-of-insolvency procedure. The measure of bankruptcy procedure goodness 
comes from these two sources. The creditors’ protection variable tells us if the bankruptcy law is good 
enough to make loans attractive to creditors, providing the firms with easier access to external finance. The 
goals-of-insolvency procedure represents the consensus about the characteristics of an efficient bankruptcy 
procedure. For a comparative analysis, we use seven groups of countries: the OECD, Latin America & the 
Caribbean
21 (LAC), the Middle East & North Africa (MENA), Europe & Central Asia (ECA), East Asia & 
the Pacific (EAP), South Asia (Sas) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The data used is from Doing Business 
2003 and 2004, World Development Indicators 2004 and International Finance Statistics 2004. 
IV. 1 – Creditors’ Protection 
The literature of Law and Finance points to the fact that a good bankruptcy law has to provide legal 
protection to creditors. In section III.1 we saw that better legal protections enable financiers to offer 
entrepreneurs money at better terms, which induces to a broader credit market.   
Several forms of bankruptcy laws are being used around the world. Some of them are too favorable to 
creditors, giving them a strong protection, like the English Law, where liquidation is nearly always used. Its 
cost is the elimination of good and still healthy firms. On the other hand there are countries like Brazil, where 
                                                           
21 Latin American and Caribbean block is composed by: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela.  38
 
the law provides a weak protection to creditors, giving priorities to labor and tax claims before claims of 
secured creditors.  
It is possible to compare the creditor protection provided by bankruptcy law in different groups of 
countries and rank the current situation of Latin America. As a measure for creditors’ protection we use the 
index constructed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
22 that summarizes creditors’ 
rights
23 in bankruptcy law interacted with a measure of enforcement. This interaction between law and 
enforcement is important because if rules and regulations are not enforced, creditor rights will be inadequate 
regardless of what is written in the bankruptcy-law procedure codes.  
Creditors’ rights is an index that is formed by adding 1 when: secured creditors are paid first; the 
manager does not stay in reorganization; there is no "automatic stay" imposed by the court; and creditors 
need to consent to file the reorganization petition. As a measure of legal enforcement was used the variable 
“rule of law”
24 that is an assessment of the law and order tradition in the country. Therefore the creditor-
protection measure is defined as: 
Creditors’ Protection = creditors’ rights x measure of enforcement. 
  Since we normalize this measure, it will vary between  [0, 1], where the score 1 means that the 
country provides the strongest level of protection to creditors; while zero means that the country does not 
protect creditors at all. 
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                                                 Source: Doing Business database and International Country Risk Guide 
                                                           
22 Their creditors’ rights measure was calculated from a sample of 49 countries and is referent to 1996. 
23 Creditors’ rights is computed by Doing Business 2003 from World Bank. 
24 Rule of Law index is computed by International Country Risk Guide. 39
 
Looking at Figure 3 that shows creditor protection in different sets of countries, we notice that the 
OECD has the highest level of creditor protection, while Latin America and the Caribbean have the lowest. 
Latin America and the Caribbean protect their creditors very poorly (even less than Sub-Saharan Africa), 
reducing the interest of creditors in the credit market, increasing the cost of capital and the difficulty for firms 
to finance their investments with debt.  
Looking more specifically at LAC countries (Figure 4), Chile has the highest creditor protection 
provided by the legal system, with a degree similar to the average of OECD countries. However, most 
countries vary between 0.05 and 0.17, which is a very low level in a measure ranging between 0 and 1. 
























                                                Source: Doing Business database and International Country Risk Guide                    
A common notion in the literature of Law and Finance is that a good bankruptcy law has to provide 
strong protection to creditors. La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998) were pioneers in studying 
empirically the relevance of this relationship. Using a sample of 49 observations, they show that countries 
with a high level of creditor protection have higher levels of financial development.  
Controlling for log (GDP), log (population), information-sharing and quality of enforcement, we 
explore the relation between the credit market development (measured by log (Private Credit/GDP)) and 
Creditors’ Protection, in a sample of 120 countries. We control for the total GDP (log (GDP)) on the theory 
that larger economies may have bigger credit markets because of economies of scale in organizing the 
supporting institutions. We control for population on the theory that countries with large population tend to 
be poorer in per capita terms (log (GDP) – log (population) = GDP per capita) with negative effects on credit 40
 
market. We use the number of days that the court takes to enforce a simple debt contract as a proxy for the 
efficiency (or quality) of legal system. Finally, we control for information-sharing
25 – that refers to data on 
the existence of public- and/or private-credit registries – to capture the adverse-selection problem in the 
credit market. In Table 2 we see that the coefficient of the creditor protection is statistically significant at the 
5% level and reveals that the bigger the protection provided by law to creditors is the larger is the credit 
market. According to the result if, for example, the Brazilian bankruptcy reform shifts its protection of 
creditors of 0.06 to the mean of Latin America (0.19) or to the mean of OECD (0.46), it would increase credit 
market in approximately 9% and 30% respectively.     
Also, the GDP, GDP per capita, information-sharing, population and quality-of-enforcement controls 
are all significant, the first three being positive and the last two negative, as we expected. The effect of 
information-sharing on credit market is considerably large but it is not important to Latin America once that 
except for Jamaica, the rest of the countries have the mechanism of information on credit registry. If Jamaica 
implements such mechanism it would increase its credit market in more than 70%. An increase in the quality 
of enforcement also produces a relevant effect on credit market. The average time that Latin America takes to 
enforce contracts is the highest between regions, 462 days. A fall of the average to OECD level (230 days) 
means an increase of 11% in Latin American credit market. Looking exclusively to Guatemala that has the 
lowest quality of enforcement (1459 days), an improvement in its mechanism that brings to Latin America 
average means an expansion of 60% of its credit market. 
Table 2: OLS regression of Private Credit/GDP on Creditors’ Protection 
              Dependent Variable: log (Private Credit/GDP) – 120 observations (average 2000 – 2003) 






Note: a=significant at the 1% level; b=significant at the 5% level; c=significant at the 10% level. 
Standard errors and covariance robust to heteroskedasticity. 
                                                           
25It is equal 1 if either public registry or a private credit bureau operates in the country, zero otherwise.  
Independent Variable  Coefficients  t-statistic 
Constant -1.06
  1.19 
Creditors’ Protection  0.66
b  2.28 
log GDP  0.40
a  9.30 
log Population  -0.25
a  4.40 
Quality of Enforcement  -0.0005
c  -1.93 
Information-Sharing 0.55
a  3.35 
Obs 120   
R-squared
  0.66  
Adjusted R-square  0.64   41
 
To examine which components of creditors’ rights index are responsible for its effect on credit 
market, we regress the measure of credit market development on each sub-index of creditors’ rights. We find 
that creditors’ consent to reorganize and priority have positive effect on credit market, with automatic stay, 
and the exclusion of managers in the process of reorganization having no significance at all.  
Table 3: OLS regression of Private Credit/GDP on each sub-index of Creditors’ Rights 
Dependent Variable: log (Private Credit/GDP) – 120 observations (average 2000-2003) 
Independent Variable  Coefficients  t-statistic 
Constant 1.32
  1.51 
Consent of creditors  0.23
c  1.74 
Priority 0.24
c  1.83 
No Autostay  -0.05  -0.37 
Manager out  0.17  1.27 
Quality of Enforcement  -0.0006
b  -2.40 
Information-Sharing 0.60
a  3.58 
log Population  -0.27
a  -5.11 
log GDP  0.42
a  11.23 
Obs 120   
R-square 0.67   
Adjusted R-square  0.64   
                  Note: a=significant at the 1% level; b=significant at the 5% level; c=significant at the 10% level. 
    Standard errors and covariance robust to heteroskedasticity. 
 
These results are aligned with theoretical claims in earlier sections that highlight: the negative effect 
when other claims such as labor and/or tax claims have priority over creditors’ claims, and the relevance of 
the role of creditors in reorganization, mainly due to the provision of protection and incentive against fraud. 
According to results in table 3 any country that reforms its bankruptcy law giving top priority to secured 
creditors tends to increase its credit market in 27% in absolute terms. Also, creditors’ consent in 
reorganization may expand credit market in 26% in absolute terms. The null effect of automatic stay and 
exclusion of managers in case of reorganization illustrates the ambiguity of both variables. The existence of 
automatic stay makes the reorganization procedure easier and reduces type I error – which increases the 
firm’s value in bankruptcy –, while its absence guarantees the fast recovery of secured creditors. The 
exclusion of managers in case of reorganization weakens their bargain power in reorganization, which 
increases creditors’ return in bankruptcy and their appeal in supply credit, but such a punishment may 
incentive managers to delay filing for bankruptcy as well as to gamble with firm’s investments as a means of 42
 
avoiding bankruptcy, both attitudes reduce creditors’ return. Using the same controls as the last regression 
their results are practically the same. 
IV. 2 – Goals of Insolvency  
Despite all the research on bankruptcy, today there does not exist a consensus on the best procedure to adopt.  
It is hard to design an optimal bankruptcy procedure from first principles, given that economists do not at this 
point have a satisfactory theory of why parties cannot design their own bankruptcy procedures (i.e., why 
contracts are incomplete). Frequently, suggestions for new bankruptcy procedures emanate from different 
visions
26. However, it is possible to identify a consensus on certain issues, such as some characteristics of an 
efficient bankruptcy procedure. 
Oliver Hart (1999) states the characteristics of a good procedure. First, there is a strong argument that 
a good bankruptcy procedure should deliver an ex-post efficient outcome, that is, it should maximize the total 
value available to be divided between the debtor, creditors and possibly other interested parties. The second 
goal concerns ex-ante efficiency, and says that a good bankruptcy procedure should preserve the bonding 
role of debt by penalizing managers and shareholders adequately in bankruptcy states. Without any adverse 
consequence at all, there is very little incentive to pay their debts. The third goal, concerned with the stability 
of priority claims, says that a good bankruptcy procedure should preserve the order of the claims defined 
when the contract was created, except that some portion of value should possibly be reserved for 
shareholders. This goal has two advantages: first, it helps to ensure that creditors receive a reasonable return 
in bankruptcy state, what encourages them to lend; second, it means that bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy 
states are not threatened differently. However, it should be remembered that criticism can be made against 
APR: the management, acting on behalf of shareholders, will have an incentive to avoid bankruptcy even if 
this gives rise to inefficient bankruptcy decisions like the gamble and delay effects. For this reason, there 
may be a case for reserving some portion of value in bankruptcy for shareholders. 
                                                           
26 See section II. 43
 
  Doing Business from World Bank computed a measure that documents the success in reaching the 
three goals-of-insolvency, as stated in Hart (1999). It is calculated as the simple average of the cost of 
insolvency (from 0 to 100, where higher scores indicate less cost), time of insolvency (from 0 to 100, where 
higher scores indicate less time), the observance of absolute priority of claims, and the efficient outcome
27 
achieved. The total Goals-of-Insolvency Index ranges from 0 to 100: a score of 100 on the index means 
perfect efficiency, while 0 means that the insolvency system does not function at all.     
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                                                  Source: Doing Business database                   
 
             Looking at figure 5, we notice that LAC countries do not have an efficient bankruptcy procedure, 
performing better than Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia alone, while the OECD has the best insolvency 
system. 
  Figure 2, in the introduction, shows that an efficient bankruptcy system has a positive effect on the 
credit market, making access to credit cheaper and easier; both results being aligned with propositions 1 and 
3 respectively. This happens because creditors are more confident in having their loans repaid when a firm 
fails. Notice that figure 2 (third graphic) also shows they are right to have this expectation.       
Table 4 reports results of regressions between goals-of-insolvency versus credit market development 
(log (Private Credit/GDP)), interest rate spread and creditors’ recovery rate. The regression between the 
                                                           
27 The efficient outcome is defined as any bankruptcy procedure that results in a going-concern sale without an interruption in 
operations, or a successful rehabilitation. 44
 
interest-rate spread and the goals-of-insolvency index is statistically significant at the 1% level
28, controlling 
for log (GDP per capita)
29. This means that for each point increased in the insolvency efficiency, the interest-
rate spread decreases by 0.13%.  
Credit market development and recovery rate are positively related with goals-of-insolvency and both 
statistically significant at the 1% level, also controlling by log (GDP per capita). In this case, for each point 
increased in the insolvency efficiency, log (Private Credit/GDP) and recovery rate increase by 0.02 and 0.83 
cents on the dollar respectively.                    
Table 4: Effects of goals-of-Insolvency 
Independent Variable: Goals-of-Insolvency 
Dependent Variable  OLS regression 
Interest rate spread   -0.13%
a 
(2.58) 
log(Private Credit/GDP)   0.02
a 
(5.70) 
Creditors’ recovery rate   0.83
a 
(12.95) 
                                          Note: a=significant at 1%. 
                                          t-Statistic are in parentheses.   
                                      Standard errors and covariance robust to heteroskedasticity. 
                                     R-square varies between 0.16 and 0.67, considering all cases.  
To exemplify the impact of an improvement in bankruptcy efficiency, let us consider a case where 
Brazil (24) increases its insolvency efficiency up to the Latin American average (46). Its interest-rate spread 
will fall approximately 3% (7% in relative terms), and its private credit and creditors’ recovery rate rises by 
19.79% (credit market expands in 55%) and 17.6 cents on the dollar respectively. If the Latin America 
average increases to OECD level (80), its interest-rate spread falls 4% (33% in relative terms), its private 
credit and recovery rate increases by 32.77% and 24.8 cents on the dollar respectively (approximately 97% 
and 93% respectively in relative terms). 
Recovery rate varies widely among countries, the most desirable being to have as big a recovery rate 
as possible, because this increases creditors’ return in bankruptcy states, reducing the cost of capital. Figure 6 
shows that the OECD has the highest recovery rate, with creditors recovering more than 70 cents on the 
dollar when a firm fails. The average in Latin America is 26 cents on the dollar of recovery, higher than 
                                                           
28 To verify if outliers (two observations in the upper left-hand side in the first graphic of figure 2) were driven the result we use a 45
 
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa alone. The worst result among Latin American countries (Figure 7) 
comes from Brazil, with a recovery rate of 0.2 cents on the dollar, and the best result is from Mexico, where 
creditors recover 64.5 cents on the dollar. The highest recovery rate in the world is Japan, with 92.4 cents on 
the dollar. 
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Therefore, it would be interesting for Latin American countries to concentrate efforts on reforming 
their bankruptcy systems in the direction of the characteristics listed by Hart (1999) to improve the efficiency 
of bankruptcy procedure and ensuing credit market conditions. 




















                                                  Source: Doing Business database                   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
quantile regression in the median. We find that the coefficient is still negative and significant. 
29 We also regress against GDP per capita to control effects of richness or poorness over the credit market.    46
 
V – Brazilian Bankruptcy Reform
30 
In the last decades, a legislative reform has taken place in several Latin American countries. Particularly, 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, México and Peru focused on their 
insolvency system, reforming their legal framework for bankruptcy. The most recent reform occurred in 
Brazil in a process that began in 1993, concluded in June 2005. This section will focus on such reform, 
explaining the characteristics of the former law, its main changes and effects over the Brazilian economy.        
V. 1 – The Former Brazilian Bankruptcy Law   
The former legal framework for corporate insolvency in Brazil was very fragmented, with the core of 
legislation for bankruptcy proceedings enacted in 1945. The Lei de Falências regulates both liquidation 
(falência) and reorganization (concordata) proceedings for merchants (i.e., a legal entity that engages in 
commerce in its usual course of conduct). State-owned corporations and private-public joint-stock companies 
were excluded from bankruptcy proceedings until 10.31.2001, when a modification allowed the bankruptcy 
of private-public joint-stock companies.    
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  Despite providing both proceedings and intending to prevent or avoid liquidation of enterprises, in 
practice the insolvency process has proven to be ineffective at maximizing asset values and protecting 
creditor rights in liquidation – bad to the cost of capital (proposition 1 and 2) – or at salvaging viable 
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distressed businesses incurring type I error. The insolvency proceeding is very slow, taking ten years on 
average to complete the whole process. The average time of insolvency proceeding in Brazil is the slowest in 
the world and much higher than the mean of Latin America countries (figure 8). Liquidation is marked by 
severe inefficiencies, and the reorganization process is obsolete and excessively rigid to provide meaningful 
rehabilitation options for modern business. 
  The process of disposing of assets is slow and highly ineffective, due to court and procedural 
inefficiency, lack of transparency and the so-called problema da sucessão, i.e. the transfer of liabilities, 
notably tax and labor liabilities to the buyer of property sold in liquidation, thus deteriorating the assets 
market value of an insolvent company. In addition, the priority given by bankruptcy law to labor and tax 
claims has the practical effect of eliminating any protection to other creditors. The process has led to an 
informal use of the system to promote consensual workouts
31. An insufficient legislative framework 
otherwise hampers workouts.    
  As a consequence of shortcomings in the present Brazilian legal and institutional system concerning 
insolvency, it is possible to conclude that: 
  creditors’ rights are only weakly protected and financial markets are characterized by a relatively low 
credit volume and high interest rates (the ratio Private Credit/GDP is only 35% and the spread of interest 
rate is 49% in average for the period of 1997 to 2002), 
  distorted incentives and the lack of effective mechanisms to support corporate restructuring result in 
disproportionately high default rates of potentially viable companies, 
  exit costs for non-viable companies are increased, 
  productivity and employment are reduced. 
  In 1993 Brazil initiated efforts to update its corporate insolvency legislation. Since then, the original 
project has undergone several amendments until the House of Representatives approved its latest version in 
October 2003. The project was sent to the Senate that introduced some further improvements to the new law, 
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being approved in July 2004. In December 2004 the modified project that had returned to the House of 
Representatives was approved again, put in effect in June 2005.  
V. 2 – Credit Market and Changes in Brazilian Bankruptcy Law  
As we saw in earlier sections, the bankruptcy law has a strong effect on the credit market, and this is not 
different in Brazil, whose credit market is not well developed, with scarce and expensive credit. To make the 
analysis more attractive, we will compare several indicators of the Brazilian credit market and bankruptcy 
law against the mean of Latin American countries and rich countries.  
Table 5: Credit Indicators 
  Private Credit/GDP (1997-2002)  Interest-Rate Spread (1997 – 2002) 
Brazil 35.00%  49.00% 
Latin American Countries  44.23%  11.00% 
OECD 102.748%  3.87% 
     Source: World Development Indicators 2004. 
Table 5 reports credit characteristics in Brazil, Latin America and the OECD. We present the 1997-
2002 mean because it is the period in which all countries had observations for private credit and interest-rate 
spread. At first sight we tend to think that Brazilian private credit as a proportion of GDP is very low when 
compared with the OECD, but it is not so inferior to the mean of Latin America countries. However, this 
situation is even worse than it seems, since a significant part of credit came from a development bank 
(BNDES) that is controlled by the government. The Development Bank finances a large share of non-
housing investments at a subsidized interest rate. Looking at the interest-rate spread confirms this chaotic 
situation. This rate is more than four times bigger than the average rate in Latin American countries and more 
than twelve times bigger than the average rate in OECD countries. 
One important reason
32 for this situation in the credit market is the design of the Brazilian bankruptcy 
law. Using the same measures as section IV, we see in Table 1 (in the introduction) that creditors have a very 
low protection in Brazil even when compared with the mean of Latin American countries. This characteristic 
reduces the expected return of creditors in insolvency states, what raises the interest rate spread and inhibits 
the supply of credit. Also from the Goals-of-Insolvency Index we see that the bankruptcy procedure is very 49
 
inefficient, being long, costly and rarely achieving efficient outcome, reducing the return in bankruptcy states 
and raising the cost of capital (see proposition 1). We can see this return in bankruptcy states as the creditors’ 
recovery rate in the case of bankruptcy, which is 0.2 cents per dollar in Brazil, while the average of Latin 
American and OECD countries is 26 and 72 cents respectively.  
 So the recent reform in the Brazilian bankruptcy law is on the way to improve the efficiency in 
insolvency procedure, with potential positive effects on the credit market and on the economic efficiency of 
the productive factors. The new law improves on existing legislation by integrating the insolvency system 
with the country’s broader legal and commercial systems, providing an option to reorganize in or out of 
court, and striking a reasonable balance between liquidation and reorganization. It also would significantly 
improve the flexibility of the insolvency legal system, by allowing the conversion of recuperation proceeding 
in liquidation, permitting the debtor’s application for rehabilitation during the procedural term awarded to 
respond in the liquidation proceeding filed against him, and introducing a new out-of-court reorganization 
system for pre-package restructuring plans. 
The new liquidation procedure suffered a series of changes itself. Its main changes are: 
C1 – Limitation of labor credit (until 150 minimum wages). 
C2 – Credit with collateral above tax credit. 
C3 – Unsecured credit above some of the tax credit. 
C4 – Firms will be sold first, preferably as a whole, and the constitution of the creditors’ list will come 
later, thus speeding up the process and increasing the value of the bankruptcy state. 
C5 – No more transference of liabilities, notably tax and labor liabilities, to the buyer of property sold in 
liquidation. 
C6 – New credit given in the reorganization step will be given first priority in liquidation. 
Notice that C1, C2 and C3 provide several expected effects on the life of firms. In the period ex-ante 
financial distress is expected a reduction of the cost of capital (proposition 2), an expansion of the credit 
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market and the set of socially efficient projects that would be financed (proposition 4), and a reduction of the 
sub-investment in effort that is exacerbated when the bankruptcy system gives priority to tax and/or labor 
claims over creditors' claims (proposition 7). In the period ex-post financial distress the portion of financially 
distressed firms probably will be reduced because the investment in effort increases, and despite the gamble 
and delay effects remaining constant, the aggregate gamble and delay effect are diminished. The expected 
effect of C4 and C5 is that the value of firms in bankruptcy states will increase and the more those creditors 
intuitively expect to receive in the insolvency state the less they will require the firm to repay in the solvency 
state, reducing the cost of capital (proposition 1). Also, C5 will speed up the process of putting the capital of 
liquidated firms to more efficient use. C6 is important for reducing the indirect costs in reorganization 
procedure, where potential buyers could be more reluctant to deal with the company or may demand more 
especially favorable terms than if C6 did not exist. This factor tends to increase: creditors’ return in the 
insolvency state, and the chance of success in reorganization.  
Notice that all these changes work to raise both measures of bankruptcy efficiency. C1 and C2 
improve secured creditors’ protection, while C4, C5 and C6 diminish costs and improve goals of insolvency. 
Reorganization was inspired in Chapter 11 of the U.S Bankruptcy Code. Unlike the old process called 
“concordata” that does not permit any renegotiation between the interested parts and with only few of them 
being entitled to recovery, now managers make a sweeping proposal of recuperation that should be accepted 
by each one of the three classes: workers, secured creditors and unsecured creditors (including trade 
creditors). Creditors, now with a more significant role at the procedure, will have to negotiate and vote for 
the reorganization plan. Looking to increase the chance of reorganization success, two changes were 
introduced by the new law. First is the application of the automatic stay by 180 days, when creditors cannot 
take any of the firm’s goods, even those given as collateral, having in view not to disturb the firms’ activities. 
The second one is related to the new credit obtained by reorganizing firms. Credit that is given in post-
bankruptcy period will have priority over older credits if liquidation occurs (see C6), motivating creditors to 
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make new loans at better terms, and reducing indirect cost brought by the insolvency. These changes may 
permit more economically efficient firms to recover, improving the balance between liquidation and 
reorganization and reducing filtering failure problems (type I error). Such balance between bankruptcy 
procedures allows for a more efficient allocation of the productive factors by both saving economically 
efficient firms that are suffering from financial distress and transferring assets of economically inefficient 
firms to more efficient use.   
An additional effect of the new reorganization procedure is the possibility of APR violations. As we 
saw in former sections, such violation incentives managers to make more efficient decisions when the firm is 
in financial distress, diminishing the perverse gambling and delay effects. On the other hand, this violation 
reduces managers’ incentive on effort at the earlier stages of firms’ life, what makes the aggregated result 
ambiguous if it were the only change in the law. However, several modifications made in liquidation and in 
reorganization should produce a reduction of the cost of capital for firms in the economy, which makes the 
gap between the return in solvency and insolvency states bigger than before the reform
33, generating a 
positive final effect on managers’ effort. Therefore, the aggregated cost of gambling effect and delay effect 
will be reduced and no longer ambiguous.       
An extrajudicial procedure was also created, which is very important in Brazil since it saves the high 
court costs. The off-the-court reorganization is a “pre-packaged” mechanism, where the majority imposes the 
decision on the minority. The private renegotiation between groups of creditors and debtors avoids several 
losses during the firm’s rehabilitation that is observed in case of open renegotiation procedure.  
Due to the relevancy of fraud in bankruptcy, important changes were made in the new law to avoid it. 
Changes in liquidation like C1 (limitation of labor credit), C2 and C3 (Credit with collateral above tax credit 
and unsecured credit above some of the tax credit) as like the important role of creditors in reorganization 
provide incentives against fraud in bankruptcy procedure. The limitation of labor credit (until 150 minimum 
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wages) diminishes the possibility of the manager to cheat the law by creating jobs to “friends” in such a way 
to receive as regular workers (for the manager) of the failing firm. Secured credit above tax and labor claims 
that makes higher the recovery of creditors in case of bankruptcy and the important role of creditors in 
reorganization raise creditors’ incentive in monitoring the bankruptcy process, mitigating fraudulent actions. 
There were several reasons for indictment for fraud in the old law, but these were not cumulative and each 
one stipulated a maximum of two years of penalization. Since the judicial process was very slow, most 
penalties were prescribed and as a result there was always the possibility of no punishment at all. Under the 
new law, those two years of penalty are cumulative and the judicial process is accelerated, hence the cost of 
fraud is expected to increase considerably. Another important change in the new law is that all frauds are 
remitted directly to the procedures of general criminal law, which is much more punitive than the special 
bankruptcy-crime law and the old special bankruptcy-crime law. Moreover, since private creditors expect to 
receive more under the new law, they will be watching the judicial procedures of bankruptcy more closely 
and most likely they will be important allies in enforcing fraud penalty.      
Besides the reform in bankruptcy law, many other changes in laws have been important to credit-
market development. Changes in mortgage law allow for the house to remain in the possession of the 
creditor, thereby circumventing the difficulty of the judiciary not to transfer property from the debtor to the 
creditor in case of default due to an ideological bias. This has caused the collapse of mortgage in Brazil. 
However, it is not clear that the situation will improve. Also, changes were made in contractual laws that 
allow for fast collection in case of unpaid debt.  
V. 3 – The Relevancy of the Judiciary  
The role of the judiciary is fundamental to the fulfillment of the law.  If rules and regulations are not properly 
enforced, even if the law is well designed it will not attain its objectives in full.      
There are two measures of enforcement that can qualify the quality of courts. The first one is the 
“quality of enforcement”, that is, the number of days that the court takes to solve a payment dispute. The 
second is called “rule of law”, which is the measure of the “law and order” tradition of a country. Table 6 53
 
indicates that under both measures, the quality of the Brazilian Judiciary is inferior to the mean in Latin 
America. Contracts take more time to be enforced and the tradition of fulfilling the law is weak.   
Table 6: Judiciary’s Quality Indicators 
  Quality of Enforcement (days)  Rule of Law [0, 6] 
Brazil   566  1.50 
Latin American Countries  440  2.35 
OECD 230  5.33 
        Source: Doing Business 2004 and International Country Risky Guide 2004. 
  Castelar (2001, 2003) made a careful study of the Brazilian Judiciary. Following his research, it is 
possible to find explanations for the low quality of the judiciary in Brazil. Castelar reports an interview held 
with entrepreneurs and magistrates. Entrepreneurs evaluate agility as bad or worse in 91% of the cases, while 
even magistrates themselves evaluate it as regular or worse in 86.4% of the cases. Like agility, the low 
capacity to forecast judiciary decisions was pointed out as an important feature of the Brazilian Judiciary. 
Asked when the decision of the magistrate reflects his political views, only 22% answered rarely or never. 
Therefore the decisions of the majority of magistrates are affected by political views. Finally, magistrates 
were asked how they would behave in the case of a conflict between (a) compliance with contracts and (b) 
the interests of less privileged social segments: only 19.7% answered option (a), that is, that they would 
follow contracts. 
Therefore, all these answers indicate an environment unfavorable to credit, indicating why 
expectations of recovery are low when a firm goes bankrupt and courts enter the process. 
However, recent changes have occurred in the Brazilian Judiciary. Congress approved a law that 
establishes the higher court’s decision as binding, which means that if a superior magistrate’s court makes 
certain decisions, a lower court cannot make a different decision in similar cases. This change reduces the 
burden of the judiciary and decreases the court’s time. There is also a law in Congress that changes the 
procedural code in order to eliminate several procedures that contribute to court delays. Both changes 




VI – Conclusion 
As a theoretical basis, we understand that a bankruptcy system should seek ex-post and ex-ante efficiency. 
Ex-post efficiency means that the procedure maximizes the total value of the firm’s assets, providing higher 
return to creditor in insolvency states and consequently lower cost of capital and larger set of financed 
projects in the economy. Ex-ante efficiency treats the optimal division of value in case of bankruptcy. 
Violations of APR have positive effects in situations of financial distress by providing incentives to reduce 
delay and investments in inefficient risky projects, but also have negative effects ex-ante financial distress by 
reducing the incentive of managers’ efforts. The effect over the cost of capital is ambiguous. Therefore its 
optimality depends particularly on the country’s characteristics that will determine which effect is more 
relevant. Priority of creditors’ claims over tax and/or labor claims proves to be more efficient than otherwise 
because of the significant positive impact on both cost of capital and managers’ effort, without negative 
impact. Additionally, it offers incentive to creditors to monitor actions of managers in bankruptcy, which 
helps to avoid fraud.   
  In practice, our empirical analysis says that Latin American countries have a poor system of 
bankruptcy with problems in both measures of bankruptcy procedure goodness. Their inefficient procedure 
does not allow maximizing the firms’ value, reducing significantly the creditors’ recovery rate and increasing 
the cost of capital. In addition, the protection for creditors is the lowest in the whole world, reducing their 
interest in supply credit, and increasing the negative impact on the credit market.   
  Due to the severe inefficiency of the bankruptcy law in Latin America, many governments have 
initiated efforts to change this picture, and a series of reforms in the bankruptcy system have occurred. The 
Brazilian case has been emphasized since it is the most recent reform in the region. Improvement in 
liquidation and reorganization procedures, as well as the creation of an extra-judicial procedure should have a 
strong and positive impact on the Brazilian credit market. The new law works to reduce the inefficiency of 
bankruptcy procedure, making it less costly and faster and providing a good balance between liquidation and 
reorganization. Moreover, the new law tries to increase both protection and the role of creditors in the 55
 
insolvency procedure. Also, despite the performance of courts in Brazil indicating an environment 
unfavorable to credit, efforts are being made to change this image. 
  These changes tend to provide a more attractive business environment to entrepreneurs. Using our 
findings in theoretical and empirical field it is possible to describe expected consequences that emerge from 
this reform. The theoretical model suggests that gains in efficiency of the procedure – that produce an 
increase in firm’s value in insolvency states – as well as the higher priority to creditors will be reflected into 
a lower cost of capital to firms and in a bigger set of financed projects, promoting entrepreneurship by the 
creation of new firms and investments, and therefore fostering the economic growth as a consequence. 
Besides, moral-hazard effects related to managers’ effort are reduced, diminishing the possibility of financial 
problems in companies. As to the efficiency of production factors, the new reorganization procedure may 
offer a good balance with liquidation, allowing that economically efficient firms continue their operations, 
and closing economically inefficient firms, moving their assets to more efficient business, what promotes 
economic gains. Therefore reforms like the Brazilian bankruptcy law reform will possibly bring significant 
and positive consequences to both the credit market and general economic efficiency. 
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Appendix A 
Personal participation and comments of Aloisio Araujo
34 in Brazilian Bankruptcy Reform. 
A. 1 – Brazilian bankruptcy reform 
A. 1.1 – History  
The current Brazilian bankruptcy law is very old, dating from the forties. In 1993 the Executive sent 
the draft of a new law, which was viewed with skepticism by specialists since it tried to save firms at all 
costs. In 2001 the president of the Central Bank, Arminio Fraga Neto, and the director of economic studies, 
Sergio Werlang, invited me to participate as a consultant in a group to study the new law from both the 
economic and juridical points of view.   
The first decision of the group was to choose between going ahead for a new law, which would take 
an enormous amount of work both in terms of convincing and the intellectual effort of adapting the draft, 
taking into consideration economic incentives, or simply amending the current one by eliminating its main 
distortion. With arguments such as that the old law contained jargon and concepts that were already in the 
domain of courts all over Brazil, which were even more convincing since business bankruptcy is under state 
rather than federal domain, and also that the draft of the new law was so bad in terms of its economic impact. 
This position also had the support of important lawyers like the eminent Luis Bulhões Pedreira, who has a 
high reputation for having written in the sixties a corporate law which at the time was quite advanced in 
terms of economic reasoning. However, it was clear that Congress was going to pass a law which preserved  
firms, or no law at all. So, the decision was made (correctly, in my view) that a new law should be pursued, a 
difficult task taking in consideration that there was a strong anti-creditor political and juridical bias, in part 
due to the high real interest in the last few years, to the much higher returns on capital and to bad income 
distribution (which, although due to differences in education, is not perceived this way). 
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   With this decision in mind, the group in charge of the project, which involved many lawyers and 
economists as well as international consultants, kept working and bargaining with Congress and in particular 
with the staff of Congressman Biolchi, the author of the original draft and an important figure in the process 
until the end. However, the former administration did not put the project to a vote, due to other priorities such 
as the independence of the Central Bank. 
In the new government, Ilan Goldfajn and Henrique Meireles, the new director of economic studies 
and president of the Central Bank, respectively, invited me to remain as a consultant. Also, due to the 
positive influence of Marcos Lisboa
35, the project became high priority. The Lower House approved it at the 
end of 2003. It contained some very sound principles, such as strengthening the creditors’ opinion on 
reorganization and eliminating some of the fiscal priorities in the selling of assets, as mentioned below. 
However, some very important elements were missing. 
At that point many economists, executives and lawyers thought that it was better not to have a new 
law since this would create even more uncertainty to creditors than the old one. Fortunately, the Senate 
presented a much more positive prospective for the new law. I happen to be a teen-age friend of the 
influential Senator of the political opposition, Tasso Jereissati, who gave me full access to all the important 
Senators in the matter, including Lucia Vania, Ramis Tebet (the head of the economic commission of the 
Senate) and Aloisio Mercadante (the leader of the government in the Senate). I found a very positive 
environment for the discussion of an important law. The Senate withdrew the fiscal priority and limited the 
labor priority in liquidation. Also, at considerably high cost the Senate allowed for an extra-judicial 
procedure of the pre-packed type that exists in the United States. Many other improvements were made. 
The challenge now is how the Judiciary is going to interpret the new law. 
A. 1.2 – The previous situation and the main changes 
•  Introduction:  The bad mechanics of credit. 
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Total credit was scarce: just 26% of GDP
36. But even worse, banks had low priority in case of liquidation. 
Therefore, in the case of any bad signs as to the economic health of a firm, banks would reduce credit even 
further since the recovery rate was so low
37. So firms would finance themselves with a delay in paying taxes. 
Since tax authorities had the priority in case of liquidation that would scare banks even further, and so on. 
Credit would just collapse to many types of firms. 
Banks do not have incentives to liquidate firms, even if they have no perspectives of recuperation. On 
the other hand, few firms are successful in recovering. This is so due to the high priority of tax in liquidation, 
combined with the Brazilian tax structure, which relies too much on indirect taxes. The situation could have 
been better if corporate taxes were more important in the tax structure, since in this case firms would not 
accumulate such a big tax debt: firms in financial distress do not have profits. Hence, banks would not fear 
liquidation so much, increasing the banks’ incentive and recovery in case of bankruptcy. 
•  The reasons for optimism 
As described above, the credit market in Brazil was in total disorder. Certain changes seemed 
impossible at the beginning of the process five years ago. The modifications obtained will introduce 
incentive mechanisms that will enable the development of credit markets in Brazil. The main changes 
obtained were: 
In liquidation: 
- Limitation of labor credit  
- Credit with collateral above tax credit 
- Unsecured credit above some of the tax credit 
- Firms will be sold first, preferably as a whole, and the constitution of the creditors’ list will come later, 
what will speed the process and increase the value of the bankruptcy state. 
- New credit given in the reorganization step will be given first priority in liquidation. 
In reorganization: 
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Inspired by Chapter 11 of the U.S Bankruptcy Code, here some of the well-known problems might be 
found, but it is certainly much better than the alternatives that try to save firms at all costs that were proposed 
initially in Brazil. Creditors will have to vote for the reorganization plan. The alternative of a new manager 
appointed by the judges was also rejected. A simplified version of it was adopted in Brazil, having some 
advantages in terms of the simplification of court procedure but missing some of the credit strength by 
making heterogeneous creditors vote together. 
The adoption of extra-judicial procedure:  
This is very important in Brazil since it saves the high court costs. 
The elimination of the provision on tax-inheritance debt:  
This almost eliminates any possibility of asset-selling for firms in distress, since the new owner would 
inherit all the labor and tax liabilities, even the hidden ones. This change will speed up the process of putting 
the capital of firms to new use, giving new incentives to mergers and acquisitions. 
A. 1.3 – What ideas failed in the Brazilian experience? 
When I first started working on the new law, I thought it would be a good idea to have a very simple 
procedure which would strengthen creditors’ rights, save on court costs and at the same time avoid a possible 
bias on the part of the judges. This last point is very well documented in Castelar and Cabral (2003). One 
possibility was to follow the suggestions of Bebchuck (1988) and Hart (1997). Their idea is simply to give 
the firm in financial distress to the senior creditor and allow the more junior creditor to buy from the senior 
for the price of his credit, and so on. Although ingenious, this idea received much opposition from lawyers 
and politicians in Brazil. Lawyers alleged that rights of the parties involved would not be fully preserved in 
the sense that the court does not have a prominent role. In general, the justice culture is against any summary 
resolution. At the political front the Congress had a bias in favor of the firms’ owners. So I had to give it up. 
Another idea was to try to follow a law of the type in England, where the creditor has more power and there 
is no effort to save firms as a whole. This could be important in countries that are reluctant to close firms, 
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even those without sound economic prospects. However, the Brazilian Congress was in the mood to pass a 
law where the emphasis was on saving firms, and Chapter 11 fulfills this role, at least it gives creditors a 
strong role in the process, although perhaps this is too complex for a poor country.  
One problem with the Brazilian law is that it is the Judge who appoints the clerk in charge of 
liquidation, rather than the creditors. 
Another problem is the solution found for tax liabilities under reorganization. As mentioned before, 
firms under distress in Brazil tend to have many tax liabilities. The solution that I proposed was for the 
government to organize an auction of the tax liabilities of firms that asked for reorganization. This way the 
auction would attract many new specialists interested in reorganizing the firm. The owner would avoid 
having too many tax liabilities for the fear of losing the control of the firm. This solution was scrapped for 
fear that it might be unconstitutional. The solution adopted was to give an automatic reorganization of the tax 
debt in 8 years. This could give firms the incentive to keep accumulating tax debts and to ask for re-
organization within five years. This could also be very bad for credit. 
A. 2 – Policy Lessons 
A. 2.1 – The Brazilian Case 
  What I learned from the Brazilian experience is that first of all the main distortions that I found are 
probably very specific to Brazil, at least I have never seen them mentioned in the international literature. The 
first distortion is the priority given to taxes over security credit. In a paper by Araujo & Lundberg (2003), it 
was shown that only four countries out of thirty-five share this unfortunate property (see Table A). Actually 
this was an important argument in convincing the Senators to change the law in a moment when everything 
looked hopeless. The fact that the tax authorities were able to collect the insignificant amount of less than 
four million dollars in a recent year makes one wonder why there was so much fighting over this, although 
corruption could be an explanation. An equally distortional aspect of the old law was the labor and tax-
inheritance provision. Again, when carefully explained by a neutral party, Congressmen understood the 
economic argument and voted to create the right incentive, but this took time. Compared with this type of 64
 
distortion, the usual debate about bankruptcy seems far less important. Countries, mainly the poor ones, 
create very distortional institutions, sometimes in the attempt to solve other distortions. In this example I 
think the distortions were created just to avoid tax evasion rather than to benefit any special group in 
particular. 
  Another lesson that I learned is that it is sensible to separate the law itself from the judiciary, although 
the two problems are to some extent related. For example, it is good to have a simpler – even if more 
imperfect – law in a less developed country. It is a big mistake to think the entire credit problem is due to the 
pro-debtor bias of the judiciary. I believe that the very low recovery rates and the very long time of 
liquidation, as shown in the World Bank data for Brazil
38, are in great part due to the lack of interest of 
creditors in a liquidation procedure from which they are not going to benefit anyhow. With the change in the 
priority in liquidation, the whole governance of liquidation is bound to change.  However, the judiciary plays 
a very important role. For example, I have been giving talks to many audiences and many judges are 
considering not calling for liquidation even if creditors vote not to accept the plan to reorganize the firm, 
although the new Brazilian legislation does not have the figure of the cram down
39 in chapter 11 of the 
American Code. 
A. 2.2 – Relations with reforms in other Latin America countries    
  Although countries do obviously learn from each other, I think each country has its own distortions. 
Brazil, for example, is in the top 40% less corrupt but in the bottom 5% with respect to credit according to 
the World Bank. So, the reforms have to take into consideration what the country has already achieved. I 
think the reforms should be conducted, as in Brazil, by a multidisciplinary group of lawyers, judges and 
economists, mainly micro-economists who have an intuition of the incentives
40 of the several parties 
involved. The main goal should be a better system, since there is no agreement among economists about what 
constitutes an optimal bankruptcy.   
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40 Some of these are described in section III. 65
 
Table A- Priority order in bankruptcy (35 countries) 
Countries
12 3 4
Australia Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit Wages
Austria Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit
Belgium Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit Tax and and Social 
Welfare claims
Bermudes Secured Credit Wages and Assignments  Post-Bankruptcy Credit Tax claims
Brazil Labor claims Tax Claims Post-Bankruptcy Credit Secured Credit
Bulgaria Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit
Canada Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit Wages (bounded) Tax claims
China Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit Labor claims Tax claims
Czech Republic Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit Labor claims
Estonian Post-Bankruptcy Credit Secured Credit Labor claims Tax claims
Finland Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit
France Wages  Post-Bankruptcy Credit Secured Credit
Germany Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit
Hong Kong Post-Bankruptcy Credit Secured Credit Labor claims Tax claims
Hungary Post-Bankruptcy Credit Secured Credit Wages Tax claims
Irland Secured Credit Tax Claims (bounded) Labor claims
Israel Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit Labor claims (bounded) Tax claims
Italy Post-Bankruptcy Credit Tax and Labor claims Secured Credit
Japan Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit Labor claims
Korea Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit
Malasya Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit Labor claims Tax claims
Netherlands Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit Tax claims Labor claims
Poland Tax claims Post-Bankruptcy Credit Secured Credit
Portugal Secured Credit Labor Claims Post-Bankruptcy Credit Tax claims
Russia Post-Bankruptcy Credit Labor Claims Secured Credit Tax claims
Scotland Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit Tax claims Labor claims
Singapure Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit Labor claims (bounded)
Slovak Republic Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit
Spain Wages (last 30 days  Tax Claims Secured Credit
and maximum of 2 mimimum wages)
Sweden Post-Bankruptcy Credit Secured Credit Tax claims labor claims
Switzerland Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit Labor claims (bounded)
Thailand Post-Bankruptcy Credit Secured Credit Labor claims 
UK Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit Tax and and Social  Labor claims
Welfare claims
United States Secured Credit Post-Bankruptcy Credit Labor claims (bounded) Tax claims 
Vietnam Post-Bankruptcy Credit Secured Credit Labor claims  Tax claims 
Priorities
 
       Source: Araujo, A., Lundberg, E., 2003: “A Nova Lei de Falências: Uma Avaliação”, Workshop of Banking and Credit,     









Table B- Data from countries 
Country creditor rights rule of law  Days to enforce  credit info. Goals of Insolv. Private Credit/GDP % Interest Rate Recovery 
between [0,1] between [0,1] contracts registry between [0,100] 2000-03 2000-02 Rate
Algeria 0,25 0,33 407 04 5 0 , 0 83 , 2 5 3 7 , 1
Angola 0,75 0,50 1011 1 8 0,04 48,65 1,2
Argentina 0,25 0,25 520 1 43 0,20 12,43 23,5
Armenia 0,5 0,50 195 0 65 0,08 11,54 39,6
Australia 0,75 1,00 157 18 0 0 , 9 24 , 9 8 8 0
Austria 0,75 1,00 374 17 1 1 , 1 2 7 2 , 5
Bangladesh 0,5 0,17 365 12 5 0 , 2 67 , 8 3 2 3 , 2
B&H 0,75 0,00 330 15 1 0 , 3 98 , 1 7 3 2 , 1
Belgium 0,5 0,67 112 19 3 0 , 9 15 , 1 1 8 6 , 2
Belarus 0,5 0,67 250 1 40 0,09 10,03 11,9
Benin 0,25 0,00 570 13 3 0 , 1 2 8 , 8
Bolivia 0,5 0,50 591 1 53 0,53 11,05 32,5
Botswana 0,75 0,58 154 17 7 0 , 1 85 , 6 6 5 0 , 9
Brazil 0,25 0,25 566 1 24 0,36 43,73 0,2
Bulgaria 0,75 0,25 440 14 8 0 , 1 86 , 5 8 3 4 , 2
Burkina Faso 0,25 0,58 458 12 9 0 , 1 3 6 , 4
Burundi 0,25 0,00 512 1 8 0,26 16,4
Cameroon 0,25 0,33 585 1 44 0,09 13,00 21,4
Cambodia 0,5 0,00 401 0 25 0,07 13,74 0
Canada 0,25 1,00 346 19 3 0 , 8 33 , 3 8 8 9 , 1
Chad 0,25 0,00 526 1 11 0,04 13,00 0
Chile 0,5 0,83 305 11 9 0 , 7 33 , 9 6 1 9 , 3
China 0,5 0,75 241 15 1 1 , 2 93 , 3 3 3 5 , 2
Colombia 0 0,17 363 17 7 0 , 2 57 , 3 9 5 4 , 6
Congo 0,5 0,17 909 08 1 , 9
Ivory Coast 0,25 0,42 525 14 4 0 , 1 5 1 4 , 8
Costa Rica 0,25 0,67 550 1 43 0,27 14,96 15,5
Croatia 0,75 0,83 415 0 50 0,47 10,95 26,1
Czech Republic 0,75 0,83 300 12 2 0 , 3 74 , 0 5 1 6 , 8
Denmark 0,75 1,00 83 17 9 1 , 4 54 , 7 0 5 9 , 8
Dom Rep. 0,5 0,33 580 13 7 0 , 3 89 , 5 2 1 7 , 1
Ecuador 0,25 0,50 388 12 4 0 , 2 99 , 6 1 1 8 , 1
Egypt 0,25 0,67 410 13 9 0 , 6 14 , 4 6 1 8 , 4
El Salvador 0,75 0,42 275 14 2 0 , 0 5 2 4 , 9
United Arab Emir. 0,5 0,67 614 12 3 0 , 6 0 4 , 7
Ethiopia 0,75 0,83 420 07 5 0 , 2 94 , 5 5 4 0
Finland 0,25 1,00 240 19 9 0 , 5 93 , 3 3 9 0 , 2
France 0 0,75 75 14 3 0 , 9 33 , 6 0 4 6 , 6
Georgia 0,5 0,00 375 0 69 0,07 22,02 20,4
Germany 0,75 0,83 184 16 1 1 , 2 57 , 0 4 5 0 , 3
Ghana 0,25 0,33 200 11 7 0 , 1 2 2 8 , 2
Greece 0,25 0,50 151 14 2 0 , 6 94 , 6 6 4 5 , 6
Guatemala 0,25 0,25 1459 14 0 0 , 2 09 , 9 5 1 8 , 3
Guinea 0,25 0,42 306 1 8 0,04 22,2
Haiti 0,5 0,33 368 1 42 0,17 17,43 1,5
Hong Kong 1 0,75 211 16 3 1 , 5 34 , 6 6 8 2 , 3
Honduras 0,5 0,25 545 11 7 0 , 4 18 , 9 5 2 1 , 5
Hungary 0,5 0,67 365 13 8 0 , 3 62 , 7 6 3 0 , 8
India 0,75 0,67 425 02 1 0 , 3 1 1 2 , 5
Indonesia 0,5 0,33 570 13 5 0 , 2 13 , 4 4 1 0 , 6
Iran 0,5 0,67 545 18 4 0 , 3 1 1 9 , 1
Ireland 0,25 1,00 217 18 8 1 , 6 83 , 7 3 8 8 , 9
Israel 0,75 0,83 585 16 7 0 , 9 23 , 8 6 3 8
Italy 0,25 0,50 1390 14 6 0 , 8 24 , 3 4 4 3 , 5
Jamaica 0,5 0,17 202 06 3 0 , 1 99 , 9 3 6 3 , 5
Japan 0,5 0,83 60 19 3 1 , 0 61 , 8 3 9 2 , 4
Jordan 0,25 0,67 342 13 7 0 , 7 65 , 7 6 2 6 , 7
Kazakhstan 0,5 0,67 400 06 5 0 , 1 7 1 3 , 4
Kenya 1 0,33 360 1 47 0,24 12,97 14,7
Korea 0,75 0,83 75 19 1 1 , 3 3 8 1 , 1
Kuwait 0,5 0,83 390 18 3 0 , 6 43 , 3 3 3 8 , 7





Lao PDR 0 0,00 443 11 4 0 , 0 8 2 3 , 3 3 0
Latvia 0,75 0,83 189 19 2 0 , 2 7 4 , 7 3 8 5
Lebanon 1 0,67 721 1 31 0,84 5,55 19,3
Lithuania 0,5 0,67 154 1 54 0,14 5,15 52,4
Macedonia, FYR 0,75 0,00 509 1 34 0,18 8,80 7,9
Madagascar 0,5 0,42 280 12 5 0 , 0 9 1 3 , 2 5 0
Malawi 0,5 0,50 277 0 40 0,10 22,46 17,6
Malaysia 0,5 0,50 300 1 52 1,37 3,19 35,4
Mali 0,25 0,50 340 1 32 0,16 6,3
Morrocco 0,25 0,83 240 1 36 0,55 8,58 34,8
Mexico 0 0,33 421 1 61 0,18 4,44 64,5
Moldova 0,5 0,83 280 0 49 0,14 9,32 29,3
Mozambique 0,5 0,50 580 1 25 0,08 8,72 12,3
Nepal 0,5 0,00 350 1 35 0,30 25,8
Netherlands 0,75 1,00 48 1 95 1,48 1,19 86,2
Nicaragua 1 0,67 155 1 58 0,40 15,84 38,1
Nigeria 1 0,25 730 1 45 0,15 8,10 33,2
Niger   0,25 0,33 330 1 37 0,05 2,6
Norway 0,5 1,00 87 1 99 0,95 2,08 87,9
New Zealand 1 1,00 50 1 90 1,18 4,48 71,4
Oman 0 0,83 455 0 29 0,38 5,66 23,6
Pakistan 0,25 0,50 395 1 63 0,28 38,1
Panama 1 0,50 355 1 36 0,99 5,62 18,2
Paraguay 0,5 0,33 285 1 46 0,25 15,80 8,7
Peru 0 0,50 441 1 67 0,24 10,54 31,1
Philippines 0,25 0,33 380 1 38 0,39 4,53 3,9
Poland 0,5 0,67 1000 1 70 0,28 5,93 68,2
Portugal 0,25 0,83 320 1 66 1,50 69,9
Romania 0 0,67 335 1 39 0,08 6,9
Russia 0,5 0,67 330 0 58 0,17 10,75 48,4
Rwanda 0,25 0,00 395 18 0 , 1 1 0
South Africa 0,75 0,42 277 1 53 1,26 4,98 31,8
Saudi Arabia 0,5 0,83 360 1 50 0,56 31,7
Senegal 0,25 0,50 485 1 73 0,19 18,8
Singapore 0,75 0,83 69 1 99 1,34 4,46 91,3
Sierra Leone 0,5 0,50 305 0 20 0,03 13,93 12,1
Slovak Republic 0,5 0,67 565 1 71 0,40 3,60 39,6
Slovenia 0,75 0,75 1003 1 41 0,22 4,93 23,6
Spain 0,5 0,75 169 1 68 1,12 1,81 83,4
Sri Lanka 0,5 0,50 440 1 35 0,29 3,95 33,1
Sweden 0,25 1,00 208 1 84 1,44 73,2
Switzerland 0,25 0,83 170 15 9 1 , 6 1 3 , 5 0 3 7
Syrian Arab Rep. 0,75 0,83 672 0 37 0,09 5,00 29,2
Tanzania 0,5 0,83 242 0 65 0,05 13,15 21,3
Taiwan 0,25 0,67 210 1 68 0,98 89,6
Thailand 0,75 0,42 390 16 2 1 , 0 2 4 , 9 0 4 2
Togo 0,5 0,50 535 1 8 0,15 14,6
Tunisia 0 0,83 27 1 50 0,67 50,1
Turkey 0,5 0,75 330 1 51 0,19 25,7
Uganda 0,5 0,67 209 0 55 0,05 13,53 35,5
UK 1 1,00 288 1 86 1,40 85,8
Ukraine 0,5 0,67 269 0 42 0,14 17,42 25,5
Uruguay 0,75 0,42 620 1 67 0,54 21,9
USA 0,25 0,83 250 1 88 2,35 68,2
Venezuela 0,5 0,17 445 1 67 0,11 7,58 4,9
Vietnam 0 0,67 404 1 33 0,42 2,61 16,4
Yemen 0 0,33 360 1 47 0,08 4,71 28,6
Zimbabwe 1 0,08 350 0 52 0,31 18,10 9,2  ´ Ultimos Ensaios Econˆ omicos da EPGE
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